

REGIONAL MILITARY INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE
MULTI-NATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM

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Strategic Studies

by

GBENGA ADETOKUNBO OWOJAIYE, MAJOR, NIGERIAN ARMY
BEng, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria, 2003

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Name of Candidate: Gbenga Adetokunbo Owojaiye, Major

Thesis Title: Regional Military Integration in West Africa: A Case Study of the Multi-National Joint Task Force in the Fight Against Boko Haram

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Douglas E. Lathrop, M.A.

_____, Member
David A. Anderson, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Michael J. Burke, M.Ed.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2016 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

REGIONAL MILITARY INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM, by Major Gbenga Adetokunbo Owojaiye, 136 pages.

The militant Jihadist group Boko Haram has established itself as a regional threat in the areas surrounding the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) of Africa. The group has carried out attacks in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, killing and abducting people and destroying villages and military bases. The group's violent activities, with the attendant casualties and regional spill-over, has posed an unprecedented threat to human security and the stability of Nigeria and the region as a whole. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union in January 2015 authorized the mobilization of a Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), made up of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency in the region. Therefore, the objective of this research is to identify what is needed to enhance the effectiveness of the MNJTF in order to build its capacity to bring back stability to the LCB region. A suitable approach to this end is to identify what can be learned from past regional military integration (RMI) efforts in West Africa. Hence, using case studies of past RMI efforts in West Africa, this thesis examines the factors that have facilitated as well as hindered successful regional military interventions in the sub-region. Findings from these case studies build the evidential base for providing recommendations to enhance the capacity and effectiveness of the MNJTF.

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ACRONYMS

| | |
|---------|---|
| AU | African Union |
| COIN | Counterinsurgency |
| ECOMICI | ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire |
| ECOMOG | ECOWAS Monitoring Group |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EU | European Union |
| MNJTF | Multi-national Joint Task Force |
| NA | Nigerian Army |
| RMI | Regional Military Integration |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAMSIL | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone |
| UNMIL | United Nations Mission in Liberia |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| US | United States |

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The quest for regional integration in Africa dates back many centuries. This was manifested in the conduct of different forms of trade. Efforts focused mainly on removing barriers to free trade in the region, increasing the free movement of people, labor, goods and capital across national borders (Masabo, Wama, and Mlyansi 2014, 2). In recent times, and with the advent of globalization, the motivation for regional integration has focused mainly on economic and security issues. As far as the economic aspect is concerned, countries integrate simply to consolidate their gains on the global competition for export markets and foreign direct investment (Hartzenberg 2011, 17). With regards to security on the other hand, countries integrate in order to develop a collective regional approach when addressing issues of regional security. In the context of security, the author Hans Van Ginkel defines regional integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct states are persuaded to shift their loyalties and political activities towards a new center to address security issues” (Ginkel, Court, and Langenhove 2003, 11). The term “Regional Military Integration” (RMI) simply refers to situations where different countries within a region bring their security forces together for the purpose of combating common security issues affecting the region.

RMI is no new phenomenon in Africa. Africa has been home to some of the most brutal violent conflicts on the globe. From the pre-colonial wars of conquest and the colonial wars of independence, to the procession of civil wars which erupted throughout the second half of the 20th Century and into the new millennium, African states have long been involved in bringing together their individual security apparatuses to address

security concerns. A great majority of past RMI structures in Africa have been concocted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) or other sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Furthermore, many RMI efforts have been directed against security threats emanating from ethnic rivalry, political disputes or resource-related conflicts originating and occurring within a single nation, and in some cases, spreading across borders.

The current security environment, in contrast to the past era, is however different. The current environment is dominated by threats posed by transnational and subnational actors. Terrorism and insurgency now encompass the myriad of challenges facing many of Africa's nation states. During an all open debate presided over by the Foreign Minister of Chad in December 2014, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) called for harmonized international action in dealing with the rising threats to security in the West African sub-region (United Nations 2015). The UNSC urged member states to develop a capacity to effectively respond to and prevent terrorists from benefitting from transnational organized crime. The concern raised by the UNSC was premised on the spate of insecurity in the region, predominantly the prevalence of terrorist activities. The Global Terrorism Index of 2015 disclosed that, in 2014, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced 10,915 deaths from 1,626 terrorist attacks, see figure 1. This was attributed mainly to the frequent attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015).




Figure 1. Chart showing Attacks and Deaths due to Terrorism for different Regions

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*, accessed 12 January 2016, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>.

Boko Haram and Transnational Terrorism

The rise of terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin region of Africa in general (see figure 2), and Nigeria in particular, began in 2009 when the terrorist group Boko Haram started to unleash its violence. Boko Haram which means “Western education is forbidden” is a Jihadist group based in northeastern Nigeria, and active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon. Boko Haram's horrendous attacks have claimed more than 13,000 civilian lives since its first violent uprising (European Parliament 2015). An analysis of recent trends in the sect's terrorist attacks underscores its dynamic nature while revealing that the threat is quickly intensifying. Since the second half of 2014, Boko Haram has undergone major transformations, aiming to expand its territory and

possibly establishing a caliphate in the region. Along that line, the sect pledged formal allegiance to the Islamic State in March 2015 (Gambhir 2015, 8).




Figure 2. Map of Africa showing countries in the Lake Chad Basin region

Source: United Nations, “Map No. 4234,” December 2004, accessed 12 December 2015, <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/niger>.

The threat emanating from the group has taken on a cross-border dimension. Boko Haram has clearly established itself as a regional threat in the areas surrounding the Lake Chad Basin of Africa. It has carried out attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, killing and abducting people and destroying villages and military bases. The group's violent activities, with the attendant casualties and regional spill-over, has posed an unprecedented threat to human security and the stability of Nigeria and the region as a whole. Its activities have also resulted in serious disruption in the agro pastoral activities around the Lake Chad Basin, thereby adding to the challenges of food insecurity in the

region (Eme and Onyishi 2014). While the group has carried out most of its attacks in northeastern Nigeria, in recent times, it has increased incursions into neighboring countries. In November 2015, suspected Boko Haram fighters attacked some towns in northern Cameroon, killing soldiers and civilians. Similarly, in Chad, the sect's attacks in the Lake region in January 2016 left scores of people dead (The Guardian News 2016).

Boko Haram has created a humanitarian catastrophe in the Lake Chad Basin region. The group's activities have resulted in massive displacement of the population, most of whom are women and children. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 93,000 people were internally displaced in the region in 2015 as a result of Boko Haram attacks (Nissen 2015). As this year came to a close, the group continued to target churches, mosques and public facilities in the entire region thereby forcing more people to flee. More gruesome is Boko Haram's reported use of children for suicide bombing missions and the unfortunate kidnapping of schoolgirls. These issues have drawn national and international condemnation. As its militants move quickly across borders, it has become increasingly difficult for security forces of Nigeria alone to handle this situation.

A Regional Multi-National Joint Task Force to tackle Boko Haram

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) in January 2015 authorized the mobilization of a Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), made up of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, to tackle Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region (European Parliament 2015). The MNJTF's main tasks are to: regain control of the areas under Boko Haram threat and occupation, support local agencies in the affected regions to maintain state authority and

provide protection to the civilian population. To set the stage for the successful accomplishment of these tasks, in March 2015, the PSC authorized an increase in strength of the MNJTF to 10,000 military and other personnel to be generated by member states (African Union 2015).

Prior to these present arrangements, the MNJTF had been established in 1994 solely for the purpose of dealing with common cross-border security issues in the Lake Chad Basin region. Its mandate was however expanded in 2012 to include counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency following the increase in the Boko Haram onslaught (Sagir 2013). Since then, efforts by the MNJTF to curb the activities of the group have faced significant challenges. The low point of the multinational response occurred at the beginning of 2015 when the Headquarters of the MNJTF was overrun by Boko Haram insurgents (European Parliament 2015). The goals of the present AU-backed MNJTF are to: create a secure environment, restore state authority, facilitate humanitarian assistance and bring back stability to the region. Ongoing efforts are therefore now focused on revamping the MNJTF to enable it to respond effectively to the security challenges in the Lake Chad Basin region. However, its recent shortfalls have raised questions about its ability to conduct a successful campaign against Boko Haram.

Research Question

Therefore, the key issue which this research seeks to address, is to identify what is needed to enhance the effectiveness of the MNJTF in order to build its capacity to restore civil security and re-establish state authority in the Lake Chad Basin region. A suitable approach to this end is to identify what can be learned from past RMI efforts in West Africa, which could inform the operation of the MNJTF and indeed other ongoing

regional counter-terrorism efforts in Africa. Bearing in mind that, unlike past UN, AU and ECOWAS led RMI efforts whose main objective as traditional peacekeepers was to maintain ceasefire in intra-state conflicts, the mandate of this current MNJTF is designed to respond to transnational terrorism. It is however intuitive that, in many ways, some of the features of past RMI efforts and the operational environments are similar. Terrorist networks pose many of the same challenges as the rebel groups and militias that past RMI efforts have dealt with. Also, in many respects, both operational environments are characterized by large ungoverned spaces, weak local institutions and large scale humanitarian crises. Another issue worth considering is that many West African countries have participated and gained invaluable experiences from counter-insurgency and peace operations which is critical for building any ad hoc RMI institution. Hence, significant lessons can be drawn from these past RMI efforts to close the most pressing gaps in the present multi-national response.

Against this backdrop, this thesis will answer the primary question: What is needed to enhance the effectiveness of the MNJTF in order to build its capacity to restore civil security and re-establish state authority in the Lake Chad Basin region? Secondary questions that, when addressed, will collectively answer the primary question, are:

1. What are the patterns and root causes of violent conflicts and insurgencies that have plagued the nation states of West Africa?
2. What constitutes the Boko Haram threat confronting the MNJTF in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region in general?
3. What are the present challenges facing the MNJTF that preclude its ability to effectively combat Boko Haram?

4. What is the origin of RMI in Africa and what are the key features?
5. What were the major issues responsible for success or failure of past RMI efforts in West Africa, notably the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1997 respectively; and the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) in 2003?
6. What lessons can be drawn from these past RMI efforts that could inform the present multinational response to the Boko Haram insurgency.
7. How can these lessons learned be used to inform strategic or policy directions across the doctrine, organizational structures, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domain?

The approach of this thesis is to first of all review the trends and patterns of violent conflicts and insurgencies that have plagued West African states. After which this thesis will examine the evolution and key features of RMI in West Africa. The thesis will then utilize a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) methodology based on case studies to evaluate the key features of past RMI efforts in West Africa. These key features include: military strategy, organizational structure, hegemony and autonomy, funding, and counter-insurgency approach. Then, using case studies of past RMI efforts in West Africa, the thesis will identify how the features facilitated or hindered successful regional military interventions in the sub-region.

Specifically, the research will employ a comparative approach to examine the major issues associated with: the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1997 respectively; and the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) in 2003. The study will focus on the roles played by the

contributing nations towards achieving the objectives of the integration while identifying the associated benefits and constraints as well as reasons for slow progress or failure. Lesson learned and findings from these case studies will form the basis for providing recommendations that could enhance the capacity and effectiveness of the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram.

Assumptions

1. Boko Haram will continue to pose a threat to security in the Lake Chad Basin region of Africa.
2. Combating Boko Haram and its transnational networks is beyond the capability of any single nation. A concerted effort is required from all the affected countries in the region.
3. There are some similarities between the current security environment in West Africa and the environments of the 1990s and early 2000s where past RMI operations were conducted. Hence, significant lessons can be drawn from past RMI efforts in West Africa to inform ongoing efforts in the present operational environment.

Definition of Key Terms, Ideas and Abbreviations

Boko Haram: Hausa word which means “Western education is forbidden.”

Boko Haram Terrorist Group: is a Jihadist group based in northeastern Nigeria, also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon. The group is officially called “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad” which is an Arabic term meaning

“People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad” (Chothia 2015).

Caliph: A title used by Muslim rulers, especially in the past (Oxford 2015).

Caliphate: The position of a caliph or an area of land that is ruled over by a caliph (Oxford 2015).

Counter-insurgency: Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes (Bureau of PM Affairs 2009).

Counterterrorism: Actions and activities to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks (Joint Chief of Staff 2014).

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): A 15-member regional group established on May 28 1975, via the treaty of Lagos, with a mandate of promoting economic integration in all fields of activity of the constituting countries. Member countries making up ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo (ECOWAS 2016).

ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG): A West African multilateral armed force established by ECOWAS in 1990 made up primarily of the Nigerian Armed Forces and militaries from Guinea, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Liberia, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (Molnar 2008).

ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI): A deployment of army contingents in 2003 from some West African states to Cote d’Ivoire acting under the auspices of the ECOWAS.

Hausa: A language spoken by some of the people of West Africa, especially in Nigeria and Niger (Oxford 2015).

Insurgency: The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region (Bureau of PM Affairs 2009).

Jihad: A holy war fought by Muslims to defend Islam (Oxford 2015).

Lake Chad Basin region of Africa: Refers to the general area around the largest lake in the Chad Basin of Africa, the lake provides water to more than 68 million people living in the four countries surrounding it (Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria) on the edge of the Sahara Desert (Hassan 2012).

Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF): A combined multi-national organization made up of the militaries of Nigeria, Chad and Niger, set up in 1998 to combat transnational crime in the Lake Chad Basin region. The present AU-backed MNJTF includes troops from Benin and Cameroon.

Regional Integration: The process whereby two or more nation-states in a region agree to co-operate and work closely together to achieve peace, stability and wealth. The objectives of regional integration could range from economic to socio-political, environmental and security (Ginkel, Court and Langenhove 2003).

Regional Military Integration (RMI): The process by which countries within a given region or sub-region combine their military instrument of power in order to develop a collective approach to address issues of regional security.

Terrorism: Any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. Or,

political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and indiscriminate psychological fear through the violent victimization and destruction of non-combatant targets (Bockstette 2008).

The Islamic State (IS)—Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS): A jihadist group which burst on to the international scene in 2014 when it seized large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq. The group also operates in eastern Libya, the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, and other areas of the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (BBC News 2016).

Transnational Terrorism: When the ramifications of terrorism transcend national boundaries through the nationality of the perpetrators and/or human or institutional victims, location of the incident, or mechanics of its resolution (Mickolus et al. 1989).

Limitations

Information on the current organizational structure of the MNJTF, the disposition of the military units and their table of organization and equipment will have contributed to the analysis in this research. However, this information is contained in classified materials and is therefore not available as reference. Hence, the research will be limited to information from unclassified materials which are available as reference. Furthermore, interviews with some personnel of the MNJTF as well as affected persons within the region would have added credibility to this research. However, due to time constraints, this aspect was not considered. Therefore, the analysis and findings from this research will be limited to information from written sources such as books and the aforementioned reference materials.

Delimitations

The analysis of RMI efforts carried out in this research, and the case studies employed are focused on the West African region. Bearing in mind that there are numerous regional security cooperation and RMI efforts across the globe, the scope of this research is limited to the West African region for three main reasons. First, the threat of Boko Haram terrorism is predominant in Nigeria, which is in West Africa. Second, three of the five countries which make up the present MNJTF, namely Nigeria, Benin and Niger, are West African states. Finally, these same countries have taken part in past regional multinational operations in West Africa under the auspices of ECOWAS. Another noteworthy delimitation is that this research only considered cases whereby the insurgency has been resolved. Therefore ongoing cases in which the outcome is yet to be determined, such as the counter-insurgency operations against Islamist rebels in Northern Mali, were not considered for evaluating the features of RMI.

Summary of Chapter 1 and Preview of Chapter 2

Chapter 1 creates the foundation for this research and sets the stage for the study and analyses of other issues in subsequent chapters. The chapter commenced by providing a brief introduction of the concepts of regional integration and RMI in Africa while highlighting the role they play in addressing security concerns in the region. From a broad perspective, the present challenges of transnational insurgency and terrorism in the region were first highlighted, thereafter, the discussion focused on the threats posed by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region and the challenges facing the present AU-backed MNJTF in its attempt to restore security and state authority to the region. All these paved the path for the development of the thesis question and the scope of the

research which involves identifying the lessons that can be learned from past RMI efforts in West Africa to inform the efforts of the MNJTF. Finally, the chapter defined the relevant terms that would be used throughout the thesis and highlighted the assumptions, limitations and delimitations.

Against the background created by chapter 1, chapter 2 will provide the theoretical base for the research and help to synthesize issues relating to the research question. The chapter will review the trends and patterns of violent conflicts and insurgencies that have plagued West African states. After which it will examine the emergence of regional organizations and the evolution of regional military operations in West Africa. Specifically, the various regional military interventions that occurred under the auspices of the UN, AU and ECOWAS in West Africa will be briefly highlighted. Finally, the chapter will discuss five major features that characterize RMI efforts in West Africa, namely, organizational structure, hegemony and autonomy, funding, organizational structure and counter-insurgency approach

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Statistical Context of Violent Conflicts in Africa

The African continent has witnessed a myriad of violent conflicts both within and across national borders. Based on statistics from the Armed Conflict Database, in Africa, around 8.5 percent of the years between 1950 and 2012 were plagued with conflict, compared to around 5 percent of the years over the same period in other regions of the world combined (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2013). This prevalence of violent conflicts in Africa was encapsulated in a study conducted by Adedeji et al. in 1999. The study revealed that, within the first four decades after the ascension of most African states from colonial rule, 48 sub-Saharan African countries suffered 80 violent conflicts. The study further highlighted that, at the beginning of the new millennium, there were over 18 countries facing armed rebellion while 11 were facing severe political crises (Adedeji 1999). The map in figure 3 shows the large concentration of violent conflicts in the Sub-Saharan region of Africa. These conflicts in question brought the economies of many of the affected countries to the brink of collapse with the attendant destruction of lives and property. During this period, countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo were crippled by conflicts in which violence and incessant killings were prevalent.




Figure 3. Map of Africa showing concentration of Conflicts in the Sub-Saharan Region

Source: Peter Larson, “African Conflicts and the Murdock Map of Ethnic Boundaries,” January 2011, accessed 26 January 2016, <http://peterslarson.com/2011/01/19/african-conflict-and-ethnic-distribution/>.

In more recent times, the number of violent conflicts and the attendant number of casualties are still alarming. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project reported that the years 2014 and 2015 recorded 39,391 and 35,220 conflict-related fatalities respectively on the African continent (ACLEDP 2016). The majority of these recent violent conflicts were due to insurgencies in the Sahel region affecting the West

African countries of Mauritania, Niger and Mali and low intensity conflicts surging around the borders of notably stable countries of Kenya, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Senegal (Annan 2014, 2). These remarkable numbers have forced researchers and strategists in academia, government institutions and the international community to pay attention to the subject of violent conflicts in Africa, while attempting to proffer mitigating solutions. A major bottleneck to addressing violent conflicts in Africa can however be attributed to the lack of understanding of the nature of these conflicts, as well as the lack of focus on the underlying causative factors. Against this backdrop, a broad definition of violent conflict is required especially from the context of the African continent. In the same light, a review of the historical perspective of violent conflicts in Africa is necessary to determine to what extent the historical periods saw patterns of conflict that reflect the patterns observed in contemporary times. This will more or less provide a fairly comprehensive picture and understanding of the background of the situation in the region.

Definition of Violent Conflict

In his book, *The Social Lens: An Invitation to Social and Sociological Theory*, Kenneth Allan highlights that “conflict theory seeks to scientifically explain the general contours of conflict in society: how conflict starts and varies” (Allan 2013, 1). Conflicts generally break out for very disparate reasons, some of which are short-lived while others are protracted. The violent conflicts that have plagued the nation states of Africa to date have historically taken different shapes and forms. The nature of these conflicts have ranged from coup d’états, riots and civil disturbances, to civil wars, insurgencies, genocides and mass murders. Given this fact, a broad definition of violent conflict, which

takes into context these different variations, is required. Much research in the literature addresses this issue concisely. An article written for the International Journal of Security and Development defines violent conflict as “a violent expression of disagreements and frustration often arising from unmet needs and aspirations” (Annan 2014,3). Another author describes violent conflict as “a measure of the fundamental disturbance in the normal social dynamics of state-societal systems” (Marshall 2005).

A definition which perhaps attempts to capture the different variations of violent conflict in Africa defines it as “the occurrence of violence perpetrated by a group on another group (as in riots and pogroms), by individuals on a group (as in insurgencies and terrorist attacks), by the state on a group, or by a group on agencies of the state (as in civil wars)” (Boix and Stokes 2007). What all these definitions infer is that, the conflicts that have plagued the states of Africa have been arguably dissimilar in degree to a large extent. Therefore, in an attempt to wrap a frame around the definition of violent conflict in Africa, one can conclude that these conflicts are of varying dimensions, durations, scales and intensities. As concisely highlighted by one author, the triggers and catalysts of violent conflict are multi-dimensional, ranging from historical animosities and colonial legacies, to factors rooted in the complexity of post-colonial realities, forces of globalization and global governance, external agencies and the vagaries of the ecological system (Omeje 2006, 4).

Violent Conflicts in Pre-colonial Africa

Although the years following the end of colonial rule recorded a high number of civil wars, violent conflicts in Africa in itself did not begin with the end of colonialism. Historical research on Africa between 1400 and 1700 carried out by Brecke et al., based

on written sources, confirms this (Brecke 1999). Prior to being carved up by colonial powers, most of the areas which encompass present day Africa were made up of tribal structures and historical kingdoms with heterogeneous political systems. Some of these areas were under forms of territorial control which resembled states. Whereas, others were closer to being stateless, some were made up of acephalous forms of political organizations (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2013). Many of the historical kingdoms were plagued by violent conflicts resulting from struggles to seize and retain resources, and territory as well as efforts to defend clans and kinsmen. As highlighted by the Nigerian historian Kenneth Omeje, some of Africa's federated ethnic clashes are age old hostile rivalries with historical animosities that date back to the unrestrained pre-colonial wars of conquest and supremacy among various African tribes, chiefdoms, clans, kingdoms and empires (Omeje 2006, 4).

The underlying causative factors surrounding many of these historical armed conflicts have little difference from those of recent times. Many of the historical insurgencies were rooted in religious and ethnic differences. A notable example of religion-based armed conflict was the Fula or Fulani Jihads or Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio which occurred across West Africa between the late 17th century and European colonization, in which Muslim Fulas took control of various parts of the region (Maiangwa 2014). Usman Dan Fodio, a religious and political leader, launched the Jihads in order to reform what he regarded as ungodly practices of the Hausa rulers and aristocrats whom he considered as anti-Islamic. Another notable example is the ethnic wars of conquest waged by the Oyo Empire in the 18th Century (Thornton 1988, 352; Smith 1989, 122). During this period, the ancient Oyo Empire in present-day Nigeria,

invaded the Kingdom of Dahomey located in the area of the present-day country of Benin to expand the dominance of the Yoruba ethnic group.

Violent Conflicts in Post-colonial Africa

The difference between most African states and the Western nations is that the latter experienced the bulk of the destabilizing effects of violent conflicts long before the birth of majority of the sovereign nations in present-day Africa. The Western nations effectively leveraged the spread of constitutional democracy and economic globalization of the 20th Century to drive socio-political and economic stability, and recover from the destabilizing effects of violent conflicts (Moe 2009). Different researchers have attempted to provide a correlation between the effects of colonialism and the outbreak of violent conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Some other researchers however argue that the outbreak of violent conflicts in many of the Sub-Saharan African states was linked to causative factors other than the effects of colonialism. Irrespective of the school of thought however, one principal finding is that, since the Second World War, violent conflict on the African continent tended to be concentrated amongst post-colonial African states (Fearon 2008).

A string of quantitative research conducted between 2003 and 2007 attributed the recurrent outbreak of civil wars which followed the colonial era in Sub-Saharan Africa to underlying structural factors other than colonialism in itself. The empirical findings from this research stated factors, such as low income, large populations, mountainous terrain, and cross-border sanctuaries as the foundations for the violent conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Salehyan 2007). These findings clearly exclude some significant factors such as ethnic and religious friction, economic

inequality, weak institutions and state discrimination against minority groups. In a different vein, another string of research conducted between 2009 and 2010 (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010), challenged the notion that ethnicity is irrelevant to the discussion of violent conflict. Building on a large body of qualitative research, they argue that the ethno-political configurations of power engineered by colonialism are linked to the civil wars that plagued post-colonial African states. Their findings conclude that the outbreak of civil war is correlated with the proportion of the population excluded on the basis of their ethnic background.

What is clear from the literature is that colonialism and the Cold War hindered many African states from taking advantage of the spread of economic globalization and constitutional democracy which dominated the 20th Century. Interruptions to self-governance caused by colonialism which was then followed by the hurriedly formed governments during the Cold War, spawned conditions that hindered true unity (Moe 2009). Under normal circumstances, the amalgamation of tribes and ethnic groups by the colonialists ought to have set the foundation for establishing closer cultural, social, religious, and linguistic ties vital for true unity. On the contrary however, colonialism and the Cold War fueled weak central institutions, division, unhealthy rivalry and disparity in development (Atofarati 1992).

Colonialism in Africa generally followed the pattern of indirect rule whereby localities were governed by coopting traditional power structures into colonial administration (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2013). This ensured a degree of continuity between the pre-colonial style of administration and that of the colonial era. The most significant factor which set the stage for violent conflicts was the arbitrary creation of

geographic and political borders by the colonial powers and the subsequent border subdivisions created by the newly formed independent states.

Research conducted by the Center for Economic Policy Research in the United States in 2011 makes three significant contributions to this end. First, using information on the spatial distribution of African ethnicities before colonization, the research shows that borders were arbitrarily drawn. Apart from the land mass and water area of an ethnicity's historical homeland, no other geographic, ecological, historical, and ethnic-specific traits predict which ethnic groups have been partitioned by the national border. Second, using data on the location of violent conflicts after the end of colonialism, the research shows that partitioned ethnic groups have suffered significantly more warfare. Moreover, partitioned ethnicities have experienced more prolonged and more devastating civil wars. Third, the research identifies sizeable spillovers, that is, violent conflicts that spread from the homeland of partitioned ethnicities to nearby ethnic regions (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2011).

Shortly after gaining independence, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were plunged into different kinds of violent conflicts of varying degrees. A substantial number of the countries that were involved in anti-colonial wars degenerated into hostilities. The majority of these conflicts during this period took the forms of ethnic, revolutionary, inter-communal or political wars. The Nigerian Civil War of 1967 to 1970 was essentially an ethnic-based secessionist violent conflict between the Ibo dominated eastern Nigeria and the Nigerian Federal Government. Similarly, the First Sudan Civil War of 1955 to 1972 was a revolutionary conflict between the northern part of Sudan and the southern Sudan region which demanded representation and more regional autonomy.

In the same vein, Kenya, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo, amongst others, all witnessed secessionist violent conflict in the years following their independence from colonial powers. The periods between the 1980s and the 1990s leading to the new millennium presented more violent and protracted intra-states conflicts which destabilized many Sub-Saharan African countries. Notable countries that plunged into violent conflict during that period include Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire (Aning and Sarjoh 2009).

Violent Conflicts in Contemporary Africa

As highlighted earlier, the violent conflicts that have dominated the African continent within the last decade or so have been largely due to the rise of terrorist networks and militant Islamist groups. Different from the violent intra-state conflicts of the 1990s and early 2000s perpetrated by warlords and rebel militias, the hostilities in the present environment have been orchestrated by sub-national and transnational Islamist groups operating in networks and focused on insurgency, terrorism, criminal enterprise and religious extremism (Artinano et al. 2014). The continent started to witness this new phase of violent conflicts mainly with the rise of Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa in 2008 (Wise 2011), Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria in 2009 (TRADOC 2015), and Ansar Dine and the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) in northern Mali in 2011 (Artinano et al. 2014) amongst others. These groups either seek greater political power within a state, autonomy, or creation of a new state. The transnational reach and scope of operations of these networks present a more daunting challenge than non-state armed groups within a single, clearly defined geographic area (Artinano et al. 2014).

One aspect that is characteristic of violent conflict in this era is the perpetration of religiously justified terrorism. Alongside other factors such as poverty, small arms proliferation, porous borders and weak government institutions, these groups have capitalized on the use of religion as a recruitment tool and a weapon to further their cause. Boko Haram specifically is the heir to a long Jihad tradition in West Africa. Its emergence follows well-established patterns of older militant Muslim groups, but it also departs significantly from past Jihadist movements because of its patterns of religious violence (Voll 2015). The group has since adopted the belief that lack of strict adherence to Salafist Islam makes a Muslim equal to infidels and, therefore a legitimate target (TRADOC 2015). Other aspects which make the nature of violent conflicts different and more challenging in this era are multifold. These include the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, both Muslims and Christians, by perpetrators, the designation of security forces as priority targets, the regional or transnational scope of their operations, their objectives, their decentralized structure and their political engagements with other transnational networks.

Dealing with the violent conflicts that dominate Africa's contemporary security environment is a very daunting challenge for security forces. This is because of the brutal and ideological nature of the threat, existence of multiple decentralized actors, and the transnational scale of operations. Combating these transnational and subnational threats undoubtedly requires collective and collaborative efforts from the affected countries in the region; it is beyond the capability of any single nation. Ultimately, this hinges on the concerted mobilization of regional security resources, development of concrete strategies for RMI, efficient harmonization of indigenous and contemporary counter-terrorism and

counterinsurgency mechanisms and all these capped up with the incorporation of lessons learned from past RMI efforts in Africa.

Evolution of Regional Military Integration in Africa

The procession of conflicts that plagued Sub-Saharan African countries paved the path for many UN-led interventions in Africa. The period between the 1990s and early 2000s alone witnessed the establishment of over 50 peace operations in more than 18 African countries (Williams 2013, 1). These operations involved collaboration between various multilateral and bilateral actors, and institutions. Table 1 shows a list of some peace operations conducted in Africa in the 1990s. During this period, these series of peace missions and their attendant financial implications overstretched the UN to the extent that by the mid-1990s, there was a growing unwillingness of the UN to intervene actively in international conflicts (Meyer 2011). The series of failures that befell the UN, notably in Somalia and Rwanda, further exacerbated the reluctance of Western governments to send their forces to Africa for peace missions. These setbacks resulted in the rise of RMI in Africa and the emergence of regional organizations and regional military bodies such as ECOWAS and ECOMOG in West Africa (Kabia 2009).

Table 1. Peace Operations in Africa in the 1990s

| Dates | Name of Operation | Location | Conflict |
|--------------|---|-----------------|--------------------------|
| 1988-1991 | United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) | Angola | Angolan Civil War |
| 1989-1990 | United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) | Namibia | Namibian War |
| 1991-1995 | United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) | Angola | Angolan Civil War |
| 1992-1994 | United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) | Mozambique | Mozambican Civil War |
| 1992-1993 | United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) | Somalia | Somali Civil War |
| 1993-1997 | United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) | Liberia | First Liberian Civil War |
| 1993-1994 | United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) | Rwanda | Rwandan Civil War |
| | | Uganda | |
| 1993-1996 | United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) | Rwanda | Rwandan Civil War |
| 1993-1995 | United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) | Somalia | Somali Civil War |
| 1994 | United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) | Chad | Aouzou Strip dispute |
| | | Libya | |
| 1995-1997 | United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) | Angola | Angolan Civil War |
| 1997-1999 | United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) | Angola | Angolan Civil War |
| 1998-1999 | United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) | Sierra Leone | Sierra Leone civil war |
| 1998-2000 | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) | CAR | CAR mutinies |
| 1999-2005 | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) | Sierra Leone | Sierra Leone civil war |
| 1999-2010 | United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) | Congo | Second Congo War |

Source: United Nations, “List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2013,” accessed 31 January 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf>.

The primary reason for the formation of regional military bodies was for them to handle ad-hoc security issues affecting their respective regions. In this new development, African states were urged to enhance their conflict resolution capacities as well as expand

the roles of their security forces to support regional organizations. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter emphasizes the purpose of these regional arrangements:

the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. (Henrikson 1996, 5)

This UN proclamation increased the willingness of the international community to support regional security initiatives and operations financially and logistically (Meyer 2011). Several African states therefore began to focus more on building their capacity to respond to regional conflicts rather than relying on external means. Amongst the numerous RMI efforts that sprang up in this era, interventions by ECOWAS and ECOMOG in West Africa in the 1990s marked an important turning point for RMI and the practice of counterinsurgency and peace operations in Africa.

The West African regional organization, ECOWAS, was founded in 1975 in order to achieve “collective self-sufficiency” for its member states by creating a single large trading bloc through an economic and trading union (Adeyemi 2003). This organization was developed primarily to promote economic and political co-operation among West African states. With the changing political climate, which called for settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or by regional bodies, debates on conflict management and how to build a response mechanism commenced. This development was heightened by the outbreak of hostilities in Liberia, and by the start of 1990, ECOWAS was already working towards, not only building a regional security apparatus, but operationalizing it as soon as possible to intervene in regional disputes. The end result was the establishment of a multilateral regional military force, ECOMOG, made up of

personnel and resources predominantly from Nigeria supported by the armies of other ECOWAS members such as Niger, Mali, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. This was the first RMI effort to be operationalized in response to armed conflict in West Africa.

Since the ECOWAS led intervention in Liberia in 1990, the regional organization has been in the forefront of countering violent conflicts through peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts some of which have been conducted under partial UN auspices. ECOWAS deployed its military force ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau in 1997 and 1998 respectively to bring an end to the hostilities that ravaged both nations. ECOWAS also launched the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) to intervene in the civil war that plagued Cote d'Ivoire in 2003. With the relapse of the 1989 Liberia civil war, in August 2003, ECOWAS deployed the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) to end the violence and bring back stability to the country (Kabia, 2009). These interventions opened up new opportunities for the maintenance of security and stability in Africa through regional arrangements.

Despite the series of shortcomings which characterized some of the ECOWAS led interventions of the 1990s and early 2000s, the body has emerged in many ways as a model for any RMI apparatus to tackle instability in Africa. Other regional bodies like the East African Community (EAC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have drawn on the examples and experience of ECOWAS to create a security apparatus within their regions (Ero 2000). The successes and failures of ECOWAS led RMI efforts therefore present a

framework from which lessons can be drawn to inform the operations of the MNJTF and indeed other RMI efforts in Africa.

Key Features of Regional Military Integration in Africa

There are certain fundamental features that characterize RMI generally. These features are the variables that define the RMI effort. They set the pace for its operationalization, performance, sustainability, adaptability and survivability. These features and the forms they take shape the RMI effort and are ultimately crucial for its success. As discussed earlier, most of the past RMI efforts that have taken place in West Africa have occurred under the administration of the UN, AU or ECOWAS. It is therefore reasonable to infer that these past RMI efforts present significant models for the analysis of the features of RMI. For the purpose of analysis, this research will consider five of these features, namely: organizational structure, hegemony and autonomy, funding, non-governmental organizations and counterinsurgency approach.

Organizational Structure in Regional Military Integration

The Cambridge Dictionary defines organizational structure as the hierarchical arrangement of lines of authority, communications, rights and duties of an organization. It determines how the roles, power and responsibilities are assigned, controlled, and coordinated, and how information flows between the different levels (Cambridge Dictionary 2013). The development of formal structures and institutions for the operationalization of RMI is vital for advancing its objectives. This is mainly because the various components that make up regional military bodies emanate from different sources with varying degrees of training and effectiveness. Typically, RMI calls for the combined

efforts of people from a variety of skills, backgrounds, nations and organizations. This issue was a major concern for many African states in the years that followed the Cold War. Most member states of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU), precursor to today's AU, were wary of committing themselves to intra-regional security obligations due mainly to their different levels of military capability (Acharya 1994).

The key issue is therefore how the regional body organizes the RMI structures to better support the strategic guidance that emphasizes its purpose and objectives. Although the military makes up the preponderance of forces, any RMI arrangement is comprised of police contingents as well as civilian staff members of different nations. Civilian personnel range from administrative support staff to civil affairs and public relations officers. The RMI arrangement also usually incorporates representatives of organizations, national and international, that provide humanitarian and other assistance to those affected by the conflict (United Nations 2012).

Generally, the organizational structure of any RMI may appear straightforward at first glance. However, as highlighted by Nicholas Simontis, each component has a large and complicated bureaucracy, with separate planning, budgeting, and programming processes. Also, each component answers to a different authority (Simontis 2013, 3). It is noteworthy that this issue is not only limited to African states. As noted by Kabia, attempts by many Third World states to build integrative mechanisms to link military establishments of member states in their region were largely unsuccessful (Kabia 2009).

As the mandates of regional military bodies expand to accommodate new kinds of security threats, their organizational structure correspondingly changes to adapt to the strategic guidance. Structures may vary from mission to mission, but essentially have

some common elements. The military component may include formed units, liaison officers and staff officers. Whenever there are formed units, a force commander is appointed to head the military component (United Nations 2012). In some RMI settings, the various components may be loosely connected within the structure of the mission and individual troop contributing countries enjoy independence of action within their assigned area of responsibility. In other instances, the members are linked through a key focal point and must report to and receive directives from the principal mission leadership (Ibrahim 2008).

Hegemony and Autonomy

One key aspect that is vital for any regional initiative is to determine who is responsible for the military component especially with regards to training and equipping and who is responsible for integrating the non-military components. In other words, the need to identify who is in charge. The advent of the Cold War saw the emergence of two competing RMI frameworks, one of which is termed “autonomous” and the other, “hegemonic.” A review of these frameworks and their practical manifestations highlights interesting issues concerning RMI. The distinction between the two is premised on the level of dependence of a regional grouping on the security guarantee offered by a hegemonic component (Acharya 1992). While RMI is a shared effort, more often than not, by a substantial margin, the hegemon of the coalition provides the preponderance of personnel, funding and equipment, while other members leverage the platform provided by the hegemon. This feature has been quite typical of many regional military arrangements especially in West Africa. The term hegemon acquires a significant

meaning which pertains to the dominance of certain ideas or assumptions (Waltz 2009, 31; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008).

While it is difficult to say outright that the existence of a hegemonic member in any coalition setting contributes to success, there are definitely certain pointers that suggest that this may be the case. For example, Comfort Ero posits that, “after nine years of active peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, ECOMOG has become an important factor in managing violence and disorder in West Africa, but not without the forceful and aggressive tactics of the regional hegemon, Nigeria” (Ero 2000). Similarly, Amitav Acharya asserts that the task of military and political coordination among a large group of weak states becomes particularly difficult, for technical, logistical and doctrinal reasons, and because of hierarchies of interest, conflicting priorities, competition for leadership and influence within the alliance (Acharya 1992).

On the contrary, other authors like Liska argue that “hegemony could be responsible for a weak RMI structure or institution, which in turn, breeds a mindset of alienation or discrimination among a group of people in a society” (Liska 1968). Similarly, in an article titled “The Limitations of Regional Organizations and Hegemonic States in International Peacekeeping and Security”, the author explains that powerful states intervene in the internal affairs of other states to further their national interests. Due to the advantageous position that hegemonic states hold in relation to weaker states, they elect to act unilaterally if they do not want to take multilateral action (Hadebe 2011). The South African military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 forms the core of the author’s study. In addition to the Lesotho case study, the author used a selected number of regional interventions in Africa to substantiate the main arguments of his investigation. In

the light of these arguments and counter-assertions, the issue of whether hegemonic regional groupings or autonomous arrangements is viable for RMI in West Africa is still subject to comparative investigation.

Funding

The availability and management of resources, financial and material, are vital to the success of any counterterrorism, counterinsurgency or peace operation. Funding is a critical issue for any regional military arrangement due to the increasing complexity of missions as well as the wide array of actors with disparate financial resources. Funding has been a major challenge for RMI in West Africa. The security forces of many of the nation states in the region lack the requisite equipment and capacity needed to adequately counter any large scale insurgency. As highlighted by Tardy, “for any contributing country or institution, the ability to finance its own operations is a precondition for both a certain level of effectiveness and some degree of political autonomy” (Tardy 2013). In practice however, the disparities in the financial means of member countries instigates a delicate relationship among members and also carries some political risks. This issue was increasingly apparent in regional military operations in Somalia and Mali (Tardy 2013).

All operations are theoretically financed by the implementing institutions’ member states (Tardy 2013). However, the funding mechanisms vary significantly from one operation to the other. Likewise, the processes put in place for management and administration of resources also vary. The UN relies on contributions from its member states to finance and sustain its operations. Past ECOWAS regional military operations, on the other hand, relied heavily on donations from the international community, and other agencies for both financial and logistical support of its operations (Ibrahim 2008). It

is reasonable to infer that the mechanisms employed for generation and administration of funds for military operations dictates to a large extent the performance of the operation. To make this deduction however, a review and analysis of trends in funding for regional military operations in West Africa is necessary.

Non-Governmental Organizations

National and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a key role in any regional military setting focused on bringing an end to violent conflict. The stakes are even higher for NGOs operating in counter-terrorism environments due to the unprecedented scale of violence perpetrated on civilians by terrorist groups. The activities of NGOs target both the root causes and the humanitarian, social and economic consequences of transnational terrorist threats (Artinano et al. 2014). Their developmental and humanitarian activities focus on reducing or alleviating the impact of terrorist related activities. They therefore provide supplementary effort to the military aspect of operations.

It is intuitive that the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups calls for a cooperative approach involving governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs. Therefore, the extent to which NGOs are effectively incorporated to compliment the RMI effort goes a long way in dictating the pace of success. The military researcher, Nicholas Simontis, highlights that there are usually many governmental and non-governmental bodies operating in regions affected by conflict. These agencies operate outside of the influence of the military tier which creates room for conflicts of interest or duplication of efforts (Simontis 2013). NGOs and IGOs, such as United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and others have

played active roles in ending violent conflicts in West Africa. The level of involvement and the institutional mechanism for their incorporation in past regional military operations have varied from mission to mission. What is vital is an integrated and holistic system that mutually supplements the efforts of the regional military body and NGOs.

Counter-insurgency Approach

Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (CT-COIN) became an international phenomenon following the September 9/11 terrorist attack on the USA. Since then, international and regional bodies have taken the issue of CT-COIN as a priority in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. Each region and sub-region has its own dynamics and terrorist threat level requiring specially devised CT-COIN initiatives which tailor responses to the threats. Where applicable, each regional CT-COIN strategy must also reflect the cross border threats posed by the prevalent terrorist groups. Ultimately, the major goal of regional integration is to strengthen the CT-COIN capacities, enhance and institutionalize cooperation among the intelligence organizations, by enabling the regional bodies to facilitate CT-COIN capacity-building of their member states.

As pointed out in a journal publication of the National Defense Research Institute, scholars, observers, and theorists draw on history to recommend certain COIN practices and criticize others (Paul, Clarke and Grill, 2010b). Insurgency in itself in West Africa has taken many forms ranging from ethnic or sectarian armed conflict to terrorism. There are different approaches to counterinsurgency which in many cases are tailored to suit the prevailing conditions in the environment. Therefore, the key issue is to study available

historical data on past RMI efforts for the purpose of understanding how different counterinsurgency practices have fared in different environments within the sub-region.

Summary of Chapter 2 and Preview of Chapter 3

Chapter 2 established a theoretical framework for the research to foster an in-depth understanding of the issues relating to the research problem. The chapter attempted to provide a contextual definition of violent conflict as it relates to the Sub-Saharan Africa region while exploring the trends and the root causes. The chapter then conducted a review of the historical perspective of violent conflicts in the region in order to determine how patterns of conflicts in the pre-colonial and post-colonial era reflect the patterns observed in contemporary times. Thereafter, the emergence of regional organizations and RMI in the region was highlighted, and finally, the major features which define the RMI effort, namely, organizational structure, hegemony and autonomy, funding, non-governmental organizations and counter-insurgency approach, were discussed.

Chapter 3 focuses on describing the methodology employed in this research. Specifically, it introduces the case studies-based Qualitative Comparative Analysis methodology and describes how the methodology will be used to evaluate the key features of RMI across different cases of regional interventions in West Africa. The goal of this is to test how the key features of RMI, described earlier in chapter 2, apply to the historic cases and how the cases fared in their counter-insurgency efforts. In addition, the chapter highlights the historical RMI cases informing the analyses and the criteria for their selection, and the approach adopted for data collection, classification and analysis.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Purpose of the Research and Sources of Data

The purpose of this research is to identify what is needed to enhance the effectiveness of the MNJTF in order to build its capacity to restore civil security and re-establish state authority in the Lake Chad Basin region. To answer this question, a suitable approach is to review historical cases of RMI in West Africa with a view to identifying lessons that can be learned from them which could inform the operation of the MNJTF and indeed other ongoing regional counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency efforts in West Africa. The purpose of this chapter therefore is to identify factors and themes that have been prevalent in past regional military interventions in Africa which, to a large extent, have shaped the conduct and outcome of RMI efforts. The focus is to determine factors that facilitated or, in some cases, hindered the success of the RMI. Deductions drawn from this will achieve two main goals. First, it will pave the path for identifying themes that have been prevalent in past RMI efforts in West Africa. Second, it will create the avenue for drawing lessons learned which can inform and enhance the operations of the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin region. In doing this, the research provides the basis for a better understanding of the dynamics and issues surrounding RMI in Africa while highlighting areas where improvements are needed.

The author proposes the use of the case studies-based Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) methodology for this research. This methodology provides room for an overview and in-depth analysis of the key features, practices and factors that feature prominently in RMI efforts. The goal is to test how some of the key features of RMI,

described earlier in chapter 2, apply to the historic cases and how the cases fared in their counter-insurgency efforts. The findings from this research will aid in building a significant evidence base to inform strategy or policy directions and operational design for the ongoing MNJTF and other future RMI efforts.

Against this backdrop, this chapter covers the methodology employed in this research. It highlights the historical RMI cases informing the analyses and the criteria for their selection, and the approach adopted for data collection, classification and analysis. The research relied on primary and secondary sources of data. The primary sources include official ECOWAS documents, such as the protocols establishing the institutions and the mandates of their operations. Secondary data was gathered through a variety of means, including books, journal articles, unpublished materials, magazines, video data and newspapers. Materials were primarily sourced from the Combined Arms Research Library, the ECOWAS Online Library, the MNJTF Headquarters, and the Internet. The goal of collecting data from a variety of sources is to enhance the theoretical base of the research and to provide significant validation of assertions made.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis based on Case Studies

The primary aim of qualitative research is to provide a complete and detailed description of issues surrounding a subject matter. The use of case studies provides the experimental foundation for qualitative analysis. As highlighted by Yin, “case studies offer researchers the opportunity to explore or describe a phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources. They allow researchers to explore individuals or organizations through complex interventions, relationships, communities, or programs” (Yin 2003). Qualitative analysis using case studies ensures that the answers to the research question

are not explored through only one lens, but rather through a variety of lenses which enable multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood (Stake 1995). The case studies based QCA methodology emphasizes detailed conceptual analysis of major situations and determines how they relate to each other. The methodology helps to capture both the process and outcome of a phenomenon through complete observation, reconstruction and analysis of the cases under investigation (Zainal 2007). This makes it possible to compare and contrast observations or variables of one case with that of other similar cases.

This research is focused on providing a platform from which certain key features of RMI can be assessed using cases of past RMI efforts in West Africa for the ultimate goal of informing present and future RMI arrangements in the region. The QCA methodology therefore provides the tool for revealing and interpreting the features that are consistent with successful or failed RMI efforts. In other words, the methodology helps to identify factors that facilitate success or failure of RMI.

Charles Ragin's Qualitative Comparative Analysis Model

The research methodology employed in this work is based on the Charles Ragin's Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) model. The Charles Ragin QCA model is a tool designed to assess differences and similarities between cases using simple logic rules (Ragin 1987). This methodology was employed by the National Defense Research Institute (RAND) in their study of a variety of approaches to counter-insurgency using case studies from different countries across the globe (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010b). In the RAND study "Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency", the authors use the QCA model to answer a broad set of questions

with regards to the contributions of range of approaches to COIN. The methodology was specifically used to report on the demonstrated effectiveness of a variety of approaches to COIN thereby making it possible to identify the historical contribution (or lack of contribution) of certain predetermined variables to the outcomes of COIN operations. Generally, the QCA model makes use of truth tables for comparing the variables in cases, using binary combinations of 1s and 0s. Whereby a 1 signifies the presence of a variable, a 0 signifies the lack or absence of that variable. The truth table in essence is a matrix of rows and columns containing 1s and 0s that represent trends in data. This model is suitable for this research because it facilitates structured data collection, classification, aggregation and analysis.

In order to effectively employ Charles Ragin's QCA model, the methodology in this research utilizes the five stages for analyzing multiple case studies as proposed by Bengtsson. Bengtsson highlights that, to effectively analyze data from multiple cases, the researcher must follow five sequential steps (Bengtsson, 1999). These steps comprise of the following stages: design, case selection, data collection, data analysis and interpretation.

Design of Data Collection Framework

Bearing in mind that different RMI cases vary significantly in detail, the first step is to design a general framework that fits all of the cases to be examined. The key features of RMI discussed in chapter 2, namely, organizational structure, hegemony and autonomy, funding, military strategy and counter-insurgency approach, form the basis for the design due to their commonality across all the cases. These key features of RMI are characteristic of typical RMI efforts in West Africa, therefore, their interplay across the

cases creates the opportunity for this research to make interesting deductions. As highlighted by Bengtsson, the generalization often sought out for in experimental designs are not equally emphasized (Bengtsson 1999). This research would therefore attempt to adapt the data as much as possible to fit the framework.

A useful way to understand the framework is to consider a data matrix as illustrated in table 1. The intention to use the QCA methodology defined, to a large extent, how the framework was structured to ease data classification and analysis. Based on examples proposed by Peter Lor in his book “International and Comparative Librarianship: A Thematic Approach”, each case of RMI being studied is referred to as an observation and each observation occupies a column. The total number of observations is denoted by X. Similarly, each of the key features of RMI to be examined per case is referred to as a variable and each variable occupies a row. The total number of variables is denoted by Y. Therefore, the resultant design is a Y by X data matrix and the data points are located where the rows intersect the columns.

Table 2. Sample Matrix for Data Collection

| | | Observations | | |
|-----------|---|---------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | Case 1 (Liberia) | Case 2 (Sierra Leone) | Case 3 (Cote d'Ivoire) |
| Variables | Variable 1 (Counterinsurgency Practice) | Data | | |
| | Variable 2 (Hegemony/Autonomy) | | | |
| | Variable 3 (Organizational Structure) | | | |
| | Variable 4 (Military Strategy) | | | |
| | Variable 5 (Funding) | | | |

Source: Created by author.

Selection of Cases

This research focused on past regional military operations conducted within the West African sub-region. As pointed out earlier, the research excludes ongoing RMI efforts in which the outcome of the operation is yet to be determined. This is primarily because the research is focused on features that contribute to the outcome of RMI efforts. The cases of RMI are drawn from a list of historical military operations carried out by sub-regional organizations and regional military bodies in West Africa. The number of cases selected for analysis were limited by time and resource constraints. The following criteria was used for selection of cases:

1. Cases involving operations conducted by government and regional military bodies against violent non-state actors seeking to take control of government or territory.
2. Cases in which the conflict resulted in at least 500 fatalities.
3. Cases in which hostilities lasted for at least four years.

Selecting cases of RMI in West Africa is a non-trivial task because there have been numerous conflicts and insurgencies in the region especially within the last three decades. An attempt was made to select RMI cases that have some similarity to the ongoing MNJTF counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram, especially in terms of duration of the conflict, number of casualties, and belligerents involved. To select cases, this research utilized the case-control study method whereby the MNJTF regional military operations against Boko Haram is used as the control, while other RMI efforts that bear some similarity with the former are selected as the cases. The RMI efforts that fall outside the selection criteria are outliers.

Therefore, as shown in table 3, the Burkina Faso Agacher Strip war was excluded because it did not meet the duration, casualties and belligerents criteria, likewise, the Guinea Bissau Civil War was excluded because it did not meet the duration criteria, while the Northern Mali conflict was excluded because it is still ongoing. The cases that were selected are suitable representations of past RMI efforts in West Africa that can be likened in many respects to the present MNJTF arrangement.

Table 3. Conflicts in West Africa

| Country/Area | Conflict | Dates/ Duration | Belligerents | Casualties |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|---|---|--|
| Nigeria/Lake Chad Basin Region | Boko Haram Insurgency | 26 July 2009 – present (6 years, 6 months, 2 weeks and 4 days) | MNJTF vs Boko Haram Islamist terrorist group | 20,000+ killed |
| Burkina Faso | Agacher Strip War | 25-30 December 1985 (5 days) | Mali vs Burkina Faso | 59-300 killed in total |
| Côte d'Ivoire | First Ivorian Civil War | 19 September 2002 – 4 March 2007 (4 years, 5 months, 1 week and 6 days) | Côte d'Ivoire government and ECOWAS regional military coalition vs rebels | Over 1,800 killed |
| Guinea Bissau | Guinea-Bissau Civil War | 7 June 1998 – 10 May 1999 (11 months, 3 days) | ECOMOG Regional military coalition of Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Senegal Forces vs military rebels | at least 655 killed in fighting, 350,000 displaced |
| Liberia | First Liberian Civil War | 1989–1997 (8 years) | Liberian Armed Forces and ECOMOG troops vs rebel groups | over 200,000 people killed |
| Mali | Northern Mali conflict | 16 January 2012 – Present | Malian Government and ECOWAS regional troops vs Tuareg militias and militant Islamist groups | 1,000–1,500+ killed |
| Sierra Leone | Sierra Leone Civil War | 23 March 1991 – 18 January 2002 (10 years, 9 months, 3 weeks and 5 days) | Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG regional troops vs rebel | over 50,000 killed |

LEGEND

| | |
|--|----------------|
| Control | Control |
| Selected Cases | Selected Cases |
| Outliers | Outliers |

Source: Wikipedia, “List of Conflicts in Africa,” accessed 2 March 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_conflicts_in_Africa.

Data Collection

As pointed out earlier, the various RMI efforts in West Africa differ significantly in many aspects. This creates the need to make adaptations to the way data is collected. This also means that some level of deviation is anticipated. It is therefore necessary to take measures to reduce bias in the results. The goal is to analyze how each of the key features of RMI fared in each of the regional military operations based on historical evidence. For all the cases, the key features are broken into sub-categories to reflect more detail.

The data collection aspect relied on information from the literature on RMI, ECOWAS documents and materials on the present MNJTF. Based on this broad review, information relating to the main features of regional military operations were extracted. The main focus is collection of information on the counterinsurgency practices employed by the regional military bodies, the effects of hegemon or autonomous states in the coalition, and other aspects such as funding, organizational structure and military strategy. Sufficient data was also collected to enable the researcher deduce whether the RMI effort in each case was considered a success or failure.

Data Analysis

As pointed out by Bengtsson, when doing multiple case studies, the goal is not statistical generalization but analytical generalization (Bengtsson 1999). According to him, it is a common misconception that multiple case studies are conducted with the purpose of gathering samples for generalization. He highlights that the goal is to get sufficient information for analytical generalization.

The data analysis aspect of this research follows three distinct steps. The first step is to conduct an overview of each of the RMI cases. The second step involves an analysis of each of the features of interest for each case to determine how they fared. The final step involves the application of the QCA methodology whereby, for each case, the key features of RMI are examined and scored as present or absent (1 or 0) based on assessment and identification of distinct factors (positive or negative) that are unique to that case.

In the first step, the goal is to extract the distinct factors affecting each case as they relate to the different key features of RMI. In the second step, an evaluation of the distinct factors is carried out to determine whether they had a general positive or negative (present or absent/1s or 0s) impact on the RMI. The last step involves assessing the key features against the final outcome of the RMI. In essence whether the regional military operation was a success or failure and which factors occurred in situations where the RMI was successful that were absent in situations where the RMI was a failure. For cases where the RMI was successful, a weighted point of 2 is applied. On the other hand, a weighted point of 1 is applied if the RMI was a failure. The ultimate goal is to identify factors that influenced the RMI in relation to the outcome of the operation. A sample data matrix of the case studies based QCA is shown in table 4.

Table 4. Sample Data Matrix using QCA methodology for each case

| LIBERIA CASE STUDY | | | | | |
|---|-------------|--------|---------|----------------------------|-------|
| VARIABLES (KEY FEATURES OF RMI) | Observation | | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
| | Present | Absent | | | |
| <u>Counterinsurgency Practice</u> 1. Significant advantage in strength and combat power compared to insurgent adversaries. 2. Regional military force established and significantly expanded secure areas. 3. Use of force yielded positive results. 4. The regional force significantly disrupted insurgent lines and bases of support. | | | | | |
| <u>Hegemony or Autonomy</u> 1. Regional body had effective control of the RMI. 2. Countries unified under the regional hegemon. 3. The hegemon was not perceived as an external aggressor. 4. The hegemon contributed immensely to the success of the RMI effort. | | | | | |
| <u>Organizational Structure</u> 1 The components had a unified goal and equal levels of commitment. 2. NGOs worked in consonance with the regional military bodies. 3. The regional force integrated local militias in their operations with positive outcomes. 4. The different countries in the RMI had designated areas of operation with freedom of action. | | | | | |
| <u>Military Strategy</u> 1. Legitimate use of force. 2. Effective intelligence gathering. 3. Effective integration of the contingents. 4. Incorporation of humanitarian assistance. | | | | | |
| <u>Funding</u> 1. RMI received adequate support and funding from external bodies. 2. Regional force had adequate funding and logistics support to conduct operations. 3. Effective identification and targeting of insurgent sources of funding. | | | | | |

Source: Created by author using matrix from Paul Christopher, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, 2010).

The RAND study provides a detailed explanation of how the Charles Ragin QCA methodology is used to evaluate COIN strategies. It describes how the key features of each case are evaluated using historic data to determine “presence” or “absence” of a particular variable. Although the study does not include information on the extent to which a certain factor (for example, funding) has to occur for it to be considered present or absent, it highlights that this determination for the various cases has to be made through careful and detailed analysis of information from various sources. The RAND study pointed out this issue by highlighting that, in their work, they engaged in “vigorous debate over whether the factors truly represented what we intended them to capture” (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010a).

The use of “present” or “absent” to evaluate variables is a very significant reason for utilizing the QCA methodology in this research work. It helps to streamline the analysis of the key features for each RMI case in three major ways. First, bearing in mind the complex and dynamic nature of COIN and RMI operations, the use of “present” or “absent” makes it possible to synthesize information and make decisive deductions. The approach also provides the opportunity to break down the analysis of each RMI case into constituent parts thereby providing a clearer picture of the interplay between the different variables. Finally, when different cases are compared side-by-side, the “present/absent” values help to reveal factors that occurred in one case but did not in other cases. This then allows for a more complete and unbiased analysis of the cases. Table 5 illustrates how “present” and “absent” values are interpreted.

Table 5. Interpretation of Present or Absent Variables

| Values | Interpretation | Remarks |
|--------|----------------|--|
| 0 | Absent | Absent denotes a situation where the impact of the variable is negligible. Or when the variable fails to yield any significant positive effect on the RMI. |
| 1 | Present | Signifies a situation where the impact of the variable is significant in shaping events and the outcome of the RMI. |

Source: Created by author

Data Aggregation and Interpretation

The final stage involves the aggregation of all the results from all the cases that were compiled in the data analysis stage. In essence, the scores recorded for each of the cases across all the variables are juxtaposed using one matrix in order to determine the trend. The objective is to identify the features of RMI that are common across different cases in relation to the outcome of the RMI effort. Deductions can therefore be made, based on historical data, on the features of RMI that have had significant influence and have contributed to the outcome of the RMI effort. Table 6 illustrates a sample Data Correlation Matrix for this stage of the methodology.

Table 6. Sample Data Correlation Matrix

| ALL CASES (ASSESSMENT) | | | | |
|---|---------|--------------|---------------|-------|
| VARIABLES (KEY FEATURES OF RMI) | SCORES | | | |
| | Liberia | Sierra Leone | Cote d'Ivoire | Total |
| <u>Counterinsurgency Practice</u> 1. The regional military force had significant advantage in strength and combat power compared to insurgent adversaries. 2. Regional military force established and significantly expanded secure areas. 3. Legitimate use of force. 4. The regional force significantly disrupted insurgent lines and bases of support. | | | | |
| <u>Hegemony or Autonomy</u> 1. Regional body had effective control of the RMI. 2. Member countries unified under the hegemon. 3. The hegemon was not perceived as an external aggressor. 4. The hegemon contributed immensely to the success of the RMI effort. | | | | |
| <u>Organizational Structure</u> 1 The components had a unified goal and equal levels of commitment. 2. NGOs worked in consonance with the regional military bodies. 3. The regional force integrated local militias in their operations with positive outcomes. 4. The different countries in the RMI had designated areas of operation with freedom of action. | | | | |
| <u>Military Strategy</u> 1. Legitimate use of force. 2. Effective Intelligence gathering. 3. Effective integration of the various contingents. 4. Incorporation of humanitarian assistance. | | | | |
| <u>Funding</u> 1. RMI received adequate support and funding from external bodies. 2. Regional force had their own adequate funding and logistical support. 3. Effective identification and targeting of insurgent sources of funding. | | | | |
| Sum of present factors/Total number of factors | | | | |

Source: Created by author.

Summary of Chapter 3 and Preview of Chapter 4

Chapter 3 covered the methodology aspect of this thesis. The chapter provided a description of the case studies-based QCA methodology, highlighted how the Charles Ragin QCA will be used for data analysis and underscored the sources of data. The historical RMI cases informing the analyses were introduced and the criteria for the selection was spelled out. Thereafter, the data collection and data analysis frameworks were illustrated. These frameworks serve as the tool for testing how the key features of RMI, described in chapter 2, apply to the historic cases and how the cases fared in their counter-insurgency efforts. The chapter then described the approach adopted for data collection, classification and analysis.

Chapter 4 will cover an overview of each of the historical RMI cases to be assessed. The main focus will be to extract the distinct factors affecting each case as they relate to the different key features of RMI. Thereafter, using the QCA data matrix presented in chapter 3, an analysis of each of the key features of RMI will be carried out for each case in order to determine how they fared. Typically, this will involve an evaluation of the key features to determine whether they had a general positive or negative impact on the RMI. Finally, the data from all the cases will be analyzed using the data correlation matrix presented in table 4 to determine which factors have generally contributed to the success of RMI in West Africa.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this research is to analyze effective approaches that can be employed to enhance the effectiveness of the ongoing regional military effort against Boko Haram and indeed future RMI efforts in the West Africa sub-region and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The purpose of chapter 4 is to carry out a detailed analysis of selected cases of past RMI efforts in West Africa. The objective is to identify themes that are common with past RMI efforts in West Africa. This will help to provide the platform from which inferences can be drawn and recommendations can be made about issues the MNJTF needs to focus on to enhance its capacity to establish civil security in the Lake Chad Basin region. To achieve this, the analytical format used by the National Defense Research Institute (RAND) in their study of various counter-insurgency operations across the globe will be adapted and employed in this analysis.

This chapter begins with an explanation on how “success” or “failure” of the regional military intervention, for each of the cases, is determined. For each of the selected cases of RMI, namely, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, a brief background to the conflict is highlighted. This is then followed by a narrative discussing each of the five key features of RMI outlined in chapter 3 (namely: COIN practice, hegemony versus autonomy, organizational structure, military strategy, and funding). Additionally, for each of the key RMI features discussed, a matrix is included with a list of variables and allocated scores of 1 or 0, depending on how the variable fared during the RMI effort. Finally, a summary of the outcome of the intervention and key takeaways which are critical to understanding the outcome, are provided. It is necessary to highlight

that the definitive “present” or “absent”, 1 or 0 values respectively, assigned to the variables are based on synthesis of information from different sources. There is therefore the possibility that some of the information could be subject to limitations such as authors’ bias or simply misinterpretation of the deductions made. However, this research has made significant effort to ensure accurate and reasonable representation of information.

Also, for each of the cases examined, a weighting factor of 1 is applied if the RMI effort was deemed a failure whereas a weighting factor of 2 is applied if the RMI effort was considered to be successful. The weighting factor is used to compute the total score of each variable thereby signifying the impact the variable has on the RMI case. In the final part of the analysis, a summation of the total score per variable across all cases is obtained to determine the level of significance of the variable. For example, if the variable: “Other countries unified under the Hegemon”, obtains a total score of 1, 1 and 2 for the Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire cases respectively, the variable will have an overall score of 4 when data from all the cases are aggregated. The determination of success or failure is made based on review of information from data sources. Finally, using information, trends and common themes found during the analysis, the author will draw inferences and lessons learnt.

Determination of Success or Failure of Regional Military Intervention

The foundation for this methodology and empirical approach was provided by the RAND study of different COIN operations around the world. As highlighted in the study, COIN operations can be categorized based on the outcome of the intervention. The

RAND study highlights that an effective COIN strategy occurs when “the government stays in power, the country remains intact, and no major concessions were granted to the insurgents.” An ineffective COIN strategy occurs when “insurgents either deposed (or otherwise led to the fall of the government) or won de facto control of a separatist region.” The RAND study also highlighted that a “mixed” result occurs when the government stays in power but “major concessions (to the insurgents) were made” (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010b). Figure 4 illustrates the logic used for assessing case outcomes.




Figure 4. Logic for Assessing Case Outcomes

Source: Created by author using information from Paul Christopher, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute (RAND), 2010).

The RAND study went on to point out that, in contemporary parlance, the outcome of most cases is “mixed.” This is because in reality the desired end result of any intervention is not always totally achieved without a compromise. The determination of “success” or “failure” of each of the cases analyzed in this research was therefore made using a combination of the approach used in the RAND study, as well as detailed synthesis of information from available sources of data. Based on this, table 7 lists the RMI cases investigated and their outcomes. This research made the determination that the regional intervention in Liberia was a failure while the interventions in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire were successful. The reasons for these deductions are highlighted in the subsequent paragraphs which cover the individual cases.

Table 7. Outcomes of Regional Military Intervention in West Africa

| Case | Outcome of RMI |
|---------------|----------------|
| Liberia | Failure |
| Sierra Leone | Success |
| Cote d’Ivoire | Success |

Source: Created by author using matrix from Paul Christopher, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, 2010).

Determination of Presence or Absence of Variables

For each of the selected cases, the variables are allocated a score of either 1 or 0, signifying presence or absence respectively. It is noteworthy that the presence of a particular variable denotes a situation where the impact of the variable was significant in shaping events and influencing how the regional intervention played out. On the other

hand, the absence of a variable signifies that the impact of the variable was either negligible or was not positive enough to create a marked effect on the regional intervention. The analysis of presence or absence of some variables, such as strength of troops, is determined based on available statistics and inferences drawn from articles or books by subject matter experts.

Case 1: Liberian Civil War

The First Liberian Civil War of 1989 to 2003 was one of the most brutal conflicts in West Africa resulting in the death of an estimated 150,000 people (PERI 2011). The conflict occurred in two phases; the first phase began in 1989 and ended in 1996. Following renewed hostilities in 1999, the second phase of the conflict began and lasted up until August 2003 when a lasting peace agreement was finally signed. The analysis of this case focuses on the first phase of this conflict.

Background to the Liberian Civil War

The Liberian Civil War was rooted in the political rivalry and ethnic divide which characterized the country. Since the founding of Liberia in 1847, its political, social and economic sphere had been dominated by the descendants of free slaves who had left America to resettle back in the country. Over the years, this resulted in economic exploitation and marginalization of the indigenous tribes as well as reciprocal resentment by the local populations against the settlers (Mackinlay and Alao 1995). The situation changed in 1980 when Samuel Doe, an indigenous man, seized control of the government (PERI 2011). Similar to the predecessor's regime of favoritism, Doe gave preferential treatment to his own ethnic group, the Khran people while carrying out unprecedented

reprisal attacks against other ethnic groups that opposed his rule, mainly the Gios and Manos. Doe's opponents, led by Charles Taylor, exploited the resentment of the disaffected ethnic groups. Taylor formed the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and launched an incursion against Doe and his Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in December 1989 (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010a). This effectively marked the commencement of the civil war. After a few months of fighting, a splinter group, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), broke away from the NPFL. This set the stage for a proliferation of warring factions and armed groups with different agendas which went on to characterize the nature of hostilities throughout the civil war.

Regional Military Intervention in Liberia

Due to the inability of ECOWAS to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the ECOMOG regional military intervention in Liberia was launched on 24 August 1990 under the code name Operation Liberty (PERI 2011). The mandate of the force was to: keep the peace, restore law and order and ensure cessation of hostilities (Taw and Grant-Thomas 1999). At the time Operation Liberty began, the ECOMOG force was made up of 4,000 troops, with Nigeria contributing about seventy per cent of the strength while the rest came from Ghana, Guinea, Gambia and Sierra Leone (Kabia 2009, 89). ECOMOG was able to influence the situation in the country and record significant success, however, the operation was also flawed with a lot of dysfunctionalities which detracted ECOMOG from effectively bringing the conflict to an end.

Liberia: Counterinsurgency Practice

Shortly after the regional force commenced COIN operations in Liberia, Taylor's NPFL launched a surprise attack, codenamed Operation Octopus, on ECOMOG positions in Monrovia (Kabia 2009, 75). ECOMOG therefore resorted to the use of force early in the intervention to deny the NPFL access to Monrovia. Force was also employed to degrade the capabilities of the NPFL as well as compel the warring factions to respect the terms of the numerous agreements. This resulted in successful offensive operations against the NPFL and the establishment of a security perimeter around Monrovia in December 1990 (Kabia 2009, 77). Another positive outcome of ECOMOG's use of force and establishment of safe havens was that it brought about the cessation of reprisal ethnic killings (Outram 1997, 201).

However, a major setback was the inability of ECOMOG to expand the security perimeter beyond the confines of Monrovia thereby leaving the populace outside the capital city exposed to the threats of the NPFL and INPFL (Kabia 2009, 89). This was largely due to the endemic problem of limited resources, inadequate troops and lack of modern equipment (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010a). As highlighted by Adibe, the mandate of ECOMOG was not matched with sufficient troops. The strength of the ECOMOG force at its peak in 1994 was 15,000 troops (Adibe 2002, 121), compared to an estimated rebel force of 60,000 (Kabia 2009, 90). This issue was well articulated by Outram where he stated that "the ECOMOG force has been too small to dissuade the factions from mounting attacks on the safe zones" (Outram 1997, 201).

Another major setback was inadequate intelligence. On several occasions, ECOMOG controlled areas were attacked by armed groups with little or no preemptive

intelligence warning (Kabia 2009, 81). Limited intelligence also resulted in ECOMOG's inability to successfully intercept insurgent lines of support especially during the initial stages of the intervention. Taylor's forces continued to receive supply of arms and land mines from Libya and Burkina Faso (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010b). Côte d'Ivoire also served as a transit way for equipment and personnel sent from Burkina Faso and Libya (Ellis 2006, 78). Therefore, in line with the foregoing discussions, the "present" and "absent" variables for COIN practice for the Liberia case study are scored as shown in table 8.

Table 8. Liberia: Counterinsurgency Practice

| Variables for Counterinsurgency Practice | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|--|------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Regional military force had significant advantage in strength and combat power compared to insurgent adversaries. | 0 | 15,000 ECOMOG troops against 60,000 rebel fighters. | 1 | 0 |
| 2. Regional military force established and significantly expanded secure areas. | 0 | ECOMOG was unable to expand security perimeter beyond Monrovia. | 1 | 0 |
| 3. Use of force and attrition of insurgents yielded positive results. | 1 | ECOMOG's use of force ended ethnic killings and safeguarded Monrovia. | 1 | 1 |
| 4. Regional military force significantly disrupted insurgent lines of support | 0 | Factions continued to receive tangible support from Libya and Burkina Faso through Ivoirian territory. | 1 | 0 |

Source: Created by author.

Liberia: Hegemony versus Autonomy

The historical rivalry of the time, which existed between French and English speaking West African countries, played out in the field and affected the RMI. Prior to the ECOMOG intervention, there were already disagreements about the necessity of the intervention mainly between Cote d'Ivoire, Mali and Togo on one side, and Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana on the other (Kabia 2009, 82). The allegations that some countries that were against the intervention provided support to some of the warring factions derailed the cohesion of the RMI (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010b). The situation was further worsened by the Anglophone-Francophone language barrier. This fueled problems of command and control, intelligence sharing and coordination (Kabia 2009, 83). Nigerian troops had to work with interpreters in many instances in order to bridge the barrier between themselves and their French speaking counterparts.

The excessive interference by home governments with operations on the ground exacerbated the rivalry and further worsened relations. The capability of the regional military force was hampered by lack of consensus at the political level as well as rivalry between commanders on the ground. This impacted cooperation and coordination especially between the Nigeria and Ghana contingents. Differences in policy and doctrine between the various national militaries that made up ECOMOG also created major setbacks. Different countries had different levels of training and dissimilar doctrine which affected planning and execution at the operational and tactical levels. For example, whereas Nigeria favored enforcement action, Ghana was more adept to maintaining a defensive posture (Adebajo 2002). Similarly, there was a significant difference in the doctrine of the Anglophone militaries and that of their Francophone counterparts. As

highlighted by Kabia, these differences between the various contingents, which was partly attributed to disparities in the training and doctrine of the respective countries, went on to hamper the success of the RMI (Kabia 2009, 83).

Another issue worth highlighting is the hegemonic posture adopted by Nigeria throughout the operation. As stated earlier, Nigeria had the preponderance of forces in the theatre. In the light of what Nigeria perceived as lack of effective control by ECOWAS, the country assumed control of most aspects of the operation. Nigeria played a significant role in maintaining security and quelling hostilities. This however did not occur without negative consequences (Ofodile 1994). Even though Nigeria's hegemonic posture helped to bridge some of the gaps created by the shortfalls of other contingents, its dominance came with resentment from other countries in the sub-region. Even Ghana, a fellow Anglophone country and a major troop contributor to the RMI effort placed several conditions on the use of its troops in response to what it perceived as Nigeria's unilateral action (Kabia 2009). Nigeria was also largely resented by some section of the populace who perceived ECOMOG as an external aggressor (Ofodile 1994). This type of friction went on to significantly shape relations and hamper the RMI effort. Therefore, in view of the aforementioned, the "present" and "absent" variables for hegemony vs autonomy for the Liberia case study are scored as shown in table 9.

Table 9. Liberia: Hegemony versus Autonomy

| Variables for Hegemony versus Autonomy | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|---|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. Regional body had effective control of the operation and the troop contributing countries. | 0 | Absence of effective ECOWAS control of ECOMOG, hence Nigeria's dominance. | 1 | 0 |
| 2. Other countries unified under a regional hegemon. | 0 | Conflict of interest and resentment of Nigeria prevented cohesion and unity of action among member countries. | 1 | 0 |
| 3. The hegemon was not perceived as an external aggressor. | 0 | ECOMOG, especially Nigeria was largely resented by some section of the populace. | 1 | 0 |
| 4. The hegemon contributed immensely to the success of the RMI effort. | 1 | Nigeria played a significant role in providing forces and funding. | 1 | 1 |

Source: Created by author.

Liberia: Organizational Structure

Lack of effective integration of the various troop contributing countries at the organizational level resulted in the inability of ECOMOG to end the conflict quickly. Kabia explained that, the operation to a large extent depended on the individual efforts of countries and their field commanders as opposed to the concerted effort of the regional force. This was largely due to the flawed lines of authority established by the regional body (Kabia 2009, 77). The lack of an effective organizational structure was also evident on the ground. There were glaring instances of inter-contingent tensions and issues with command and control. For example, the Ghanaian battalion commander refused to take orders from his Nigerian ECOMOG Chief of Staff (Kabia 2009, 83). In another instance, the Nigerian government interfered with the operation by asking for the return of all

Nigerian officers above the rank of colonel because the Guinea Deputy Force Commander was only a lieutenant colonel, therefore Nigerian officers could not serve under him (Adebajo 2002).

Apart from the lack of integration of the military elements of the operation, ECOMOG also suffered from the lack of integration of NGOs and IGOs. This was due to the fact that at the peak of hostilities, the UN and other NGOs had little or no presence on the ground to provide humanitarian aid. Moreover, there was no plan at the strategic level to incorporate the peace building efforts, provided by NGOs and IGOs, into the operation. The presence of displaced persons throughout the operational environment posed a severe hindrance to the success of the operation (Olonisakin 1999, 20). ECOMOG was however able to improvise, effectively evacuating civilians to places of safety in neighboring countries as well as providing food and medical supplies to meet the desperate needs of the Liberian people. The “present” and “absent” variables for organizational structure for the Liberia case study are scored as shown in table 10.

Table 10. Liberia: Organizational Structure

| Variables for Organizational Structure | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|--|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. The components of the regional force had a unified goal and equal levels of commitment. | 0 | Rivalry and disagreements between troop contributing countries. | 1 | 0 |
| 2. Effective integration of the various national militaries. | 0 | Differences at the organizational level caused problems on the ground. | 1 | 0 |
| 3. The different countries in the RMI had designated areas of operation with freedom of action. | 0 | Excessive interference by home governments. | 1 | 0 |
| 4. NGOs worked in consonance with the regional military bodies. | 0 | Limited or no integration of the UN or other NGOs with ECOMOG. | 1 | 0 |

Source: Created by author.

Liberia: Military Strategy

ECOMOG was engaged in fierce fighting with the NPFL early in the intervention. This compelled the regional force to compromise its neutrality by aligning with the INPFL and other local militias (Kabia 2009, 75). With the assistance of local factions, such as United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), INPFL and AFL, ECOMOG was able to repel incursions from the NPFL and expand its security perimeter within Monrovia. This ensured that there was a semblance of security within ECOMOG controlled areas. Although this alliance with local militias yielded some positive results, it went on to characterize the military strategy of ECOMOG and seriously derail its efforts (Ofodile 1994). In September 1990, the INPFL exploited the free access it had to ECOMOG Headquarters by abducting and brutally murdering Doe (Kabia 2009, 75). This issue is also closely linked with ECOMOG's inability to infiltrate the warring factions for the purpose of gathering intelligence. Kabia explains that, the understanding

that most of the warlords were more interested in wealth and personal power came at a very late stage in the process (Kabia 2009, 75). This lack of understanding of the nature of the conflict and key actors derailed ECOMOG's military strategy to a large extent.

Another major problem that hampered the ECOMOG effort was the lack of incorporation of humanitarian aid into planning at the strategic level. The entire humanitarian effort of ECOMOG was ad hoc and the mission only responded to humanitarian problems as they arose (Kabia 2009, 85). The regional force was unilaterally focused on peace enforcement without due consideration for humanitarian operations. ECOMOG's enforcement strategy also brought about the question of legitimate use of force. This came in the aftermath of Operation Octopus. Human rights groups accused ECOMOG of using overwhelming force in response to the NPFL invasion. This was in the light of ECOMOG's indiscriminate bombing of non-military targets (Human Rights Watch 1993). In view of the aforesaid, the "present" and "absent" variables for military strategy for the Liberia case study are scored as shown in table 11.

Table 11. Liberia: Military Strategy

| Variables for Military Strategy | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|---|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. The regional force integrated local militias in their operations with positive outcomes. | 1 | ECOMOG integrated local militias into their operations with some success. | 1 | 1 |
| 2. Legitimate use of force. | 0 | ECOMOG was accused of focusing unilaterally on enforcement strategies. | 1 | 0 |
| 3. Efficient Intelligence gathering. | 0 | Inadequate knowledge of insurgent operations. | 1 | 0 |
| 4. Incorporation of humanitarian assistance into planning. | 0 | No plans at the strategic level to incorporate humanitarian efforts. | 1 | 0 |

Source: Created by author.

Liberia: Funding

Bearing in mind the weak economies of the troop contributing countries, funding was to play a major role in defining the proceedings of the intervention. ECOWAS was unable to fund the operation. The lack of interest shown by the international community shattered any hopes of any external sources of funding. The US on its own part offered very limited support due to its policy of distancing itself from the military regime of Nigeria (Howe 1996). Nigeria was therefore forced to shoulder close to ninety per cent of the financial responsibility for the operation (Adebajo 2002). As expected, Nigeria itself became drained and this resulted in poor living conditions for troops and inadequate logistics support.

On the other hand, at the political level, ECOMOG struggled to sever Taylor's sources of funding. The extent of Libya's involvement in the Liberian conflict, with regards to funding of the NPFL, is still yet to be fully determined. It was not until after

the conflict ended that NGOs and scholars began to document Libya’s role in facilitating the Liberian civil war. From their findings, a large portion of the resources and training that fueled the war is believed to have been supplied by Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi (Aning and Sarjoh 2009). The “present” and “absent” variables for funding for the Liberia case study are scored as shown in table 12.

Table 12. Liberia: Funding

| Variables for Funding | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|--|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. RMI received adequate support and funding from external bodies. | 0 | Bulk of the operation was funded by Nigeria without external support. | 1 | 0 |
| 2. Regional force had adequate funding and logistics support to conduct operations. | 0 | Poor living conditions for troops, shortage of arms, lack of modern equipment and logistics support. | 1 | 0 |
| 3. Effective identification and targeting of insurgent sources of funding. | 0 | No evidence to support targeting of insurgent sources of funding. | 1 | 0 |

Source: Created by author.

Key Takeaways from the Regional Military Intervention in Liberia

In the light of many of the highlighted setbacks, the ECOMOG operation in Monrovia recorded some positive achievements. In spite of the little achievements of the RMI effort, the inability of the force to expand its secure zones beyond the confines of Monrovia meant that it was unable to bring an end to the conflict. This was as a result of the several factors highlighted earlier which include: lack of cohesion between the various countries that made up the RMI, funding problems, lack of resources and

inadequate intelligence, over-reliance on enforcement mechanisms without due cognizance of integrating peacebuilding programs, as well as lack of integration of humanitarian aid into planning, and neglect by NGOs. It was therefore no surprise that following a lull of hostilities in 1996, the civil war resurfaced in 1999 and lasted another four years until a lasting resolution was eventually reached in 2003.

The lessons learned from the RMI efforts in Liberia indicate that enforcement action, which was the primary approach of ECOMOG, is able to manage the conflict and prevent the situation from worsening especially the humanitarian aspect. However, the Liberia case also proves that enforcement action alone cannot successfully bring an end to conflict. It is vital for enforcement action to be complemented by other stability and peace building mechanisms such as disarmament, restoration of essential services, re-establishment of civil control and resettlement of displaced persons. Another major lesson that can be drawn from the Liberia case is the impact of lack of cohesion on the RMI effort. ECOMOG in Liberia was disjointed at the political, operational and tactical levels. The language barrier, political rivalry, and disparities in doctrine and training all went on to hamper the success of the RMI. Finally, the impact of other fundamental issues such as lack of funding, logistics support and humanitarian aid, were significant in shaping the outcome of the RMI. A matrix representation of all the variables of the Liberia RMI effort as they played out is illustrated in table 13.

Table 13. Liberia Case Study

| LIBERIA CASE STUDY | | | | |
|---|-----------------|---|----------------------------|-------|
| Variables | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
| <u>Counterinsurgency Practice</u> 1. Regional military force had significant advantage in strength and combat power compared to insurgent adversaries. 2. Regional military force established and significantly expanded secure areas. 3. Use of force and attrition of insurgents yielded positive results. 4. Regional military force significantly disrupted insurgent lines of support. | 0 | 15,000 ECOMOG troops against 60,000 rebel fighters. | 1 | 0 |
| | 0 | ECOMOG was unable to expand safe zone beyond Monrovia. | 1 | 0 |
| | 1 | ECOMOG's use of force ended ethnic killings and safeguarded Monrovia. | 1 | 1 |
| | 0 | Factions continued to receive tangible support from Libya and Burkina Faso through Cote d'Ivoire. | 1 | 0 |
| <u>Hegemony or Autonomy</u> 1. Regional body had effective control of the operation and the troop contributing countries. 2. Other countries unified under a regional hegemon. 3. The hegemon was not perceived as an external aggressor. 4. The hegemon contributed immensely to the success of the RMI effort. | 0 | Absence of effective ECOWAS control of ECOMOG, hence Nigeria's dominance. | 1 | 0 |
| | 0 | Conflict of interest and resentment of Nigeria prevented cohesion and unity of action among member countries. | 1 | 0 |
| | 0 | ECOMOG, especially Nigeria was largely resented by some section of the populace. | 1 | 0 |
| | 1 | Nigeria played a significant role in providing forces and funding. | 1 | 1 |
| <u>Organizational Structure</u> 1 The components of the regional force had a unified goal and equal levels of commitment. 2. Effective integration of the various national militaries. | 0 | Rivalry and disagreements between troop contributing countries. | 1 | 0 |
| | 0 | Differences at the organizational level caused problems on the ground. | 1 | 0 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|---|
| 3. The different countries in the RMI had designated areas of operation with freedom of action. | 0 | Excessive interference by home governments | 1 | 0 |
| 4. NGOs worked in consonance with the regional military bodies. | 0 | Limited or no integration of the UN or other NGOs with ECOMOG. | 1 | 0 |
| <u>Military Strategy</u> | | | | |
| 1. The regional force integrated local militias in their operations with positive outcomes. | 1 | ECOMOG integrated local militias into their operations with some success. | 1 | 1 |
| 2. Legitimate use of force. | 0 | ECOMOG was accused of focusing unilaterally on enforcement strategies. Inadequate knowledge of insurgent operations. | 1 | 0 |
| 3. Efficient Intelligence gathering. | 0 | Differences in doctrine, training and language barrier | 1 | 0 |
| 4. Incorporation of humanitarian assistance into planning. | 0 | No plans made at the strategic level to incorporate humanitarian efforts | 1 | 0 |
| <u>Funding</u> | | | | |
| 1. RMI received adequate support and funding from external bodies. | 0 | Bulk of the operation was funded by Nigeria without external support. | 1 | 0 |
| 2. Regional force had adequate funding and logistics support to conduct operations. | 0 | Poor living conditions for troops, shortage of arms, lack of modern equipment and logistics support. | 1 | 0 |
| 3. Effective identification and targeting of insurgent sources of funding. | 0 | No evidence to support targeting of insurgent lines of support | 1 | 0 |

Source: Created by author

Case 2: Sierra Leone Civil War

The Sierra Leone Civil War of 1991 to 2002 was a brutal conflict which resulted in over 50,000 fatalities (Gberie and Addo 2004, 6). Similar to most Sub-Saharan African countries that experienced civil wars in that era, the Sierra Leone conflict was rooted in

ethnic divide, economic and social marginalization, political rivalry and failure of state institutions. The immediate cause of the conflict was attributed mainly to the war over diamonds and politicization of the military.

Background to the Sierra Leone Civil War

Following the independence of Sierra Leone in April 1961, politics in the country continuously suffered a major problem of illegitimacy (Kabia 2009, 108). The country experienced one corrupt regime after another and a succession of military coups. The inevitable results were the weakening of state institutions alongside economic and social decline. Most of the disenfranchised youths, mainly from the allegedly marginalized Mende region of the country, became easy prey for disgruntled politicians who were keen on pursuing their own political agendas (Davies 2002).

It was against this backdrop that, on 23 March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) mostly made up of disgruntled youths, with support from rebels fighting for Charles Taylor in neighboring Liberia, led an incursion against the Joseph Momoh government (Davies 2002). The RUF launched a campaign of overarching terror in the areas they seized, resulting in a humanitarian catastrophe and destruction of property. By 1992, the RUF had taken control of large swathes of territory in the south and eastern regions including the diamond mines in the Kono District. Sales from so-called conflict diamonds fueled the insurgency (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010a, 159). As a result of the ineffective response of the Momoh-led government to the insurgency and the disruption in government diamond production, a military coup ensued in April 1992 which brought the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) into power (Gberie and Addo 2004, 103). The years between 1993 and 1995 were characterized by intermittent conflict

between the RUF and the NPRC led Sierra Leone Army (SLA), with neither side able to gain a major advantage in the fighting (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010a, 160). In a move to stamp out the insurgents, the NPRC hired Executive Outcomes (EO), a South Africa-based private military company, to repel the RUF. This resulted in a proliferation of armed groups and local militias in the conflict. EO was able to stabilize the country enough for presidential elections to hold in April 1996 (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010a, 160). The results brought the ascension to power of Tejan Kabbah and the Sierra Leonean People's Party (SLPP). However, in May 1997, another military coup was staged by Johnny Paul Koromah which brought in the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) as the new government of Sierra Leone (Abdullah 2006, 180). The coup received wide condemnation and massive human rights abuses followed. Total breakdown of law and order ensued, threatening to bring the country to the brink of final collapse.

Regional Military Intervention in Sierra Leone

The volatile security situation prompted the intervention of ECOMOG forces in February 1998. The mandate of ECOMOG was to monitor the established ceasefire agreement, enforce sanctions and embargo, and secure the peace in Sierra Leone (ECOWAS 1997). To achieve this, the regional administration adopted a three point strategy, namely, dialogue, imposition of embargo and sanctions, and should these fail, then use of force. This new force acquired the name "ECOMOG II" in reference to the previous ECOMOG intervention in Liberia.

Sierra Leone: Counterinsurgency Practice

The six months long dialogue process yielded no success following series of breakdowns in talks. In fact, the dialogue process more or less frustrated the RMI effort as it bought time for the AFRC and RUF to regroup, rearm and consolidate their position (Kabia 2009, 112). When dialogue failed to achieve any tangible results, ECOWAS imposed sanctions on the AFRC. Total embargo was placed on all supplies of petroleum, arms and all military hardware to Sierra Leone while the regional military force was tasked to enforce the sanctions on the ground. Using naval and air patrols, ECOMOG successfully enforced the blockade. ECOMOG prevented supplies for the AFRC from entering the ports and intercepted arms caches from neighboring Liberia. The sanctions and embargo went on to play a significant role in degrading the capabilities of the AFRC. However, the situation proved that the embargos and sanctions alone were not sufficient to end the conflict. Also, a few underground gun-running networks from Burkina Faso and Monrovia were still able to slip through the blockade (Kabia 2009, 113).

Following the continued fighting despite the blockade, ECOMOG launched Operation Sandstorm in February 1998. This commenced the use of force phase of the ECOWAS three-point agenda in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG was also successful in establishing and expanding safe havens. ECOMOG was able to deploy in major towns and cities across Sierra Leone to protect civilians from the AFRC and RUF onslaught (Kabia 2009, 118). In very difficult circumstances, the ECOMOG troops repelled the rebel offensive, degraded their capabilities, and brought security and stability to the areas. Different from the situation in Liberia where ECOMOG was unable to expand the security zone beyond Monrovia, in Sierra Leone, ECOMOG was able to achieve a

countrywide deployment. In addition, the military enforcement mechanism was complemented at later stages with the peace building processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. This set the conditions for a stable government.

In terms of strength, similar to the Liberia situation ECOMOG did not have an overwhelming number of troops compared to the rebel fighters. At the early stages, ECOMOG had a small number of troops compared to a rebel force of almost 20,000. However, with the involvement of the UN and the launch of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999, the situation changed. The intervention recorded an additional strength of 17,500 military personnel (United Nations 2005). Therefore, in line with the foregoing discussions, the “present” and “absent” variables for COIN practice for the Sierra Leone case study are scored as shown in table 14.

Table 14. Sierra Leone: Counterinsurgency Practice

| Variables for Counterinsurgency Practice | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|--|------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Regional military force had significant advantage in strength and combat power compared to insurgent adversaries. | 1 | The UNAMSIL-ECOMOG co-deployment provided strength and combat power advantage over the rebel forces. | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Regional military force established and significantly expanded secure areas. | 1 | ECOMOG was able to deploy in major towns and cities across Sierra Leone to protect civilians and repel rebel offensives. | 2 | 2 |
| 3. Use of force and attrition of insurgents yielded positive results. | 1 | ECOMOG's use of force degraded rebel factions when dialogue failed | 2 | 2 |
| 4. Regional military force significantly disrupted insurgent lines of support | 1 | ECOMOG successfully enforced blockade and sanctions and prevented resupply for rebel fighters. | 2 | 2 |

Source: Created by author.

Sierra Leone: Hegemony versus Autonomy

The position of Nigeria as the regional hegemon was also significant to the proceedings of the operation. Similar to the situation in Liberia, Nigeria led the ECOMOG intervention and provided the preponderance of forces. Nigeria was bent on preventing the conflict from spilling over and affecting the situation in neighboring Liberia (Francis 2001). The hegemonic posture however still resulted in some setbacks. The enforcement approach of Nigeria was not supported by other ECOWAS countries who perceived the actions of the former as unilateral (Kabia 2009, 115). The historical rivalry between Francophone and Anglophone countries which existed during the Liberia civil war, also took its toll on the operation. This affected operations on the ground and flawed coordination at the political and strategic levels. Home governments also further worsened the situation by excessive interference with military operations on the ground. Like the case of Liberia, differences in training and doctrine as well as language barrier also hampered operational planning and tactics on the ground.

In contrast with the situation in Liberia, the large number of civilians that opposed the AFRC regime meant that ECOMOG and Nigeria had massive support from the local populace. Kabia explained that, the rapid success of ECOMOG can be attributed to the massive civilian opposition to the coup (Kabia 2009, 114). In fact the ousted president was still viewed by a large proportion of the populace, as the legitimate leader of the country. Therefore, in view of the aforementioned, the “present” and “absent” variables for hegemony vs autonomy for the Sierra Leone case study are scored as shown in table 15.

Table 15. Sierra Leone: Hegemony versus Autonomy

| Variables for Hegemony versus Autonomy | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|---|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. Regional body had effective control of the operation and the troop contributing countries. | 0 | Absence of effective ECOWAS control of ECOMOG, hence Nigeria's dominance. | 2 | 0 |
| 2. Other countries unified under a regional hegemon. | 0 | Conflict of interest and resentment of Nigeria prevented cohesion and unity of action among member countries. | 2 | 0 |
| 3. The hegemon was not perceived as an external aggressor. | 1 | ECOMOG and Nigeria were welcome by the local populace due to the huge resentment they had for the AFRC regime and the mayhem caused by the RUF. | 2 | 2 |
| 4. The hegemon contributed immensely to the success of the RMI effort. | 1 | Nigeria played a significant role in providing forces and funding. | 2 | 2 |

Source: Created by author.

Sierra Leone: Organizational Structure

The coup in Sierra Leone was widely condemned by the member states of ECOWAS (Kabia 2009, 110). This set the stage for a unified goal and the determination at the political level to restore the Kabbah government. For the very first time, West African states had taken concerted steps to restore democracy. This unity of effort also translated to improved coordination on the ground compared to the Liberia situation. However, the old rivalry that affected the Liberia RMI resurfaced. Troops received directives from their home governments which more often than not contradicted orders on the ground (Adeshina 2002).

In addition to securing major towns and cities, ECOMOG incorporated the activities of NGOs into its operations. ECOMOG protected the major roads linking the capital city to other provinces. This allowed vital aid supplies from NGOs to reach affected people (Richards 2003). Although some reports indicated that the relations between ECOMOG and NGOs was very tense, the situation gradually improved especially with the involvement of the UN in the intervention. The “present” and “absent” variables for organizational structure for the Sierra Leone case study are scored as shown in table 16.

Table 16. Sierra Leone: Organizational Structure

| Variables for Organizational Structure | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|--|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. The components of the regional force had a unified goal and equal levels of commitment. | 1 | Widespread condemnation of the coup facilitated unity of effort. | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Effective integration of the various national militaries. | 1 | Improved coordination between contingents. | 2 | 2 |
| 3. The different countries in the RMI had designated areas of operation with freedom of action. | 0 | Excessive interference by home governments. | 2 | 0 |
| 4. NGOs worked in consonance with the regional military bodies. | 1 | ECOMOG was able to secure routes for operations by NGOs | 2 | 2 |

Source: Created by author.

Sierra Leone: Military Strategy

The ability to gather significant intelligence played a huge role in the successes recorded by ECOMOG troops at the early stages of the operation. ECOMOG was able to use the local militia, the Kamajors, to gain adequate knowledge of the ground, rebel

groups and other vital information. The Kamajors also contributed in strength to facilitate the expansion of safe havens. Furthermore, soldiers that defected from the AFRC provided ECOMOG with sensitive intelligence (Kabia 2009, 114).

International support from the UN and NGOs in terms of humanitarian assistance was negligible at the early stages of the ECOMOG intervention. Hence, besides their task of establishing civil security and restoration of essential services, ECOMOG troops had to evacuate civilian casualties, provide rations for displaced persons and even assisted with the reconstruction of infrastructure (Adeshina 2002). All these actions were undertaken outside the mandate of the operation, and just like the Liberian case, humanitarian assistance was not incorporated into higher level planning. What salvaged the humanitarian situation was the eventual involvement of the UN. Hence, the UNAMSIL-ECOMOG co-deployment marked a significant turning point with regards to humanitarian support. In view of the aforesaid, the “present” and “absent” variables for military strategy for the Sierra Leone case study are scored as shown in table 17.

Table 17. Sierra Leone: Military Strategy

| Variables for Military Strategy | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|--|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. The regional force integrated local militias in their operations with positive outcomes. | 1 | ECOMOG successfully integrated the Kamajors and private militias | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Legitimate use of force. | 1 | ECOMOG maintained credibility with local and international community. | 2 | 2 |
| 3. Efficient Intelligence gathering. | 1 | Local militias, private military companies and defectors provided vital intelligence to ECOMOG | 2 | 2 |
| 4. Incorporation of humanitarian assistance into planning. | 0 | No plans at the strategic level to incorporate humanitarian efforts. | 2 | 0 |

Source: Created by author.

Sierra Leone: Funding

The mission suffered from lack of funding and adequate support from the international community. Similar to the case of Liberia, the financial aid pledged to ECOMOG in numerous UN meetings was not fulfilled. The troops therefore lacked modern equipment and suffered from inadequate logistical support. The ECOMOG troops were able to weather the storm. Also, in some cases, private military companies, like the UK based Sandline International and Executive Outcomes, provided logistic support to ECOMOG troops (Africa Confidential 1998). This however did not come without criticism as the private military companies were linked to mining operations and therefore accused of exploitative ambitions in Sierra Leone. With the involvement of the UN however, the situation with regards to funding and logistical support improved. The involvement of British troops operating alongside UNAMSIL also further strengthened

the coalition and was decisive in ending the conflict. The “present” and “absent” variables for funding for the Sierra Leone case study are scored as shown in table 18.

Table 18. Sierra Leone: Funding

| Variables for Funding | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|---|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. RMI received adequate support and funding from external bodies. | 0 | Bulk of the operation was funded by Nigeria without external support. | 2 | 0 |
| 2. Regional force had adequate funding and logistics support to conduct operations. | 1 | The inadequate logistics support of ECOMOG was augmented by private military companies and eventually the UN. | 2 | 2 |
| 3. Effective identification and targeting of insurgent sources of funding. | 1 | ECOMOG effectively disrupted insurgent lines of support. | 2 | 2 |

Source: Created by author.

Key Takeaways from the Regional Military Intervention in Sierra Leone

A major factor that contributed to the success of the intervention in Sierra Leone was an improvement in intelligence capabilities. The local populace, members of the local militia and mercenaries played significant roles in providing intelligence to ECOMOG troops. This was largely because ECOMOG was able to maintain credibility and good relationships with the local population. Also, at the operational headquarters, the establishment of a military information cell vastly enhanced the force’s ability to conduct threat and enemy assessments (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010a). In addition, ECOMOG troops were able to secure better equipment and logistic support, initially

through private military companies, and eventually by virtue of the involvement of the UN in the operation.

As a result of major consensus from countries in the sub-region, ECOMOG was able to establish and enforce a blockade which hampered logistical supply for the adversaries. In addition, the ability of ECOWAS to incorporate enforcement mechanisms and peace-building strategies represented a significant shift from the Liberian situation. This aspect came into effect mainly as a result of the UN and British involvement in the mission. Approximately 47,000 ex-combatants turned in their weapons, making the use of force by the regional military force largely unnecessary throughout the final phase of the insurgency (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010a). Despite the many setbacks, the ECOMOG regional military intervention was successful in restoring democracy in Sierra Leone. The RMI in Sierra Leone can be considered a remarkable achievement bearing in mind the endemic logistical and financial limitations of the force. A matrix representation of the key features and variables of the Sierra Leone RMI effort as they played out is illustrated in table 19.

Table 19. Sierra Leone Case Study

| SIERRA LEONE CASE STUDY | | | | |
|--|------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| Variables | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
| <u>Counterinsurgency Practice</u> 1. Regional military force had significant advantage in strength and combat power compared to insurgent adversaries. 2. Regional military force established and significantly expanded secure areas. | 1 | The UNAMSIL-ECOMOG co-deployment provided strength and combat power advantage over the rebel forces. | 2 | 2 |
| | 1 | ECOMOG was able to deploy in major towns and cities across Sierra Leone to protect civilians and repel rebel offensives | 2 | 2 |

| | | | | |
|--|---|--|---|---|
| 3. Use of force and attrition of insurgents yielded positive results. | 1 | ECOMOG majorly used enforcement action to degrade rebel factions when dialogue failed | 2 | 2 |
| 4. Regional military force significantly disrupted insurgent lines of support. | 1 | ECOMOG successfully enforced blockade and prevented resupply for rebel fighters | 2 | 2 |
| <u>Hegemony or Autonomy</u> | | | | |
| 1. The international or regional body had effective control of the operation and the troop contributing countries. | 0 | Absence of effective ECOWAS control of ECOMOG, hence Nigeria's dominance. | 2 | 0 |
| 2. Other countries unified under a regional hegemon. | 0 | Conflict of interest and resentment of Nigeria prevented cohesion and unity of action among member countries. | 2 | 0 |
| 3. The hegemon was not perceived as an external aggressor. | 1 | ECOMOG was welcome by the local populace due to the huge resentment they had for the AFRC regime and the mayhem caused by the RUF. | 2 | 2 |
| 4. The hegemon contributed immensely to the success of the RMI effort. | 1 | Nigeria played a significant role in providing forces and funding. | 2 | 2 |
| <u>Organizational Structure</u> | | | | |
| 1 The components of the regional force had a unified goal and equal levels of commitment. | 1 | Widespread condemnation of the coup facilitated unity of effort. | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Effective integration of the various national militaries. | 1 | Improved coordination between contingents. | 2 | 2 |
| 3. The different countries in the RMI had designated areas of operation with freedom of action. | 0 | Excessive interference by home governments hampered operations especially at the early stages | 2 | 0 |
| 4. NGOs worked in consonance with the regional military bodies. | 1 | ECOMOG was able to secure routes for operations by NGOs | 2 | 2 |
| <u>Military Strategy</u> | | | | |
| 1. The regional force integrated local militias in their operations with positive outcomes. | 1 | ECOMOG successfully integrated the Kamajors and private military companies. | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Legitimate use of force. | 1 | ECOMOG maintained credibility with local population and international community | 2 | 2 |
| 3. Efficient Intelligence gathering. | 1 | Local militias, private military companies and RUF defectors provided vital intelligence to ECOMOG | 2 | 2 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|---|
| 4. Effective incorporation of humanitarian assistance. | 0 | No plans at the strategic level to incorporate humanitarian efforts. | 2 | 0 |
| <u>Funding</u> | | | | |
| 1. RMI received adequate support and funding from external bodies. | 0 | Bulk of the operation was funded by Nigeria without external support. | 2 | 0 |
| 2. Regional force had adequate funding and logistics support to conduct operations. | 1 | The inadequate logistics support was augmented by private military companies and eventually the UN | 2 | 2 |
| 3. Effective identification and targeting of insurgent sources of funding. | 1 | ECOMOG effectively interrupted insurgent lines of support | 2 | 2 |

Source: Created by author.

Case 3: Cote d'Ivoire Civil War

The First Ivorian Civil War began in September 2002 when soldiers, who were about to be demobilized from the Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire, mutinied in the capital city of Abidjan (Malan 2004). Many of the soldiers originated from the north of the country and one of the main catalysts for their protest was a law passed by the Ivorian government which required both parents of a presidential candidate to be have been born within Côte d'Ivoire and ultimately excluded the northern presidential candidate Alassane Ouattara from the race. The law also reduced the representation of majority of the northern people from government. Within a very short period of time, the protests transformed to violent attacks and spread from Abidjan to the north effectively bringing the northern part of the country under the control of the renegade soldiers. The violent attacks resulted in a humanitarian tragedy. Within the first few days of violence an estimated 400 people had been killed (Kabia 2009), including the country's first military president, Robert Guei, while thousands had been displaced from their home.

Background to the Regional Intervention in Cote d'Ivoire

The Cote d'Ivoire Civil War itself is rooted in the grievances of the people from the predominantly Muslim northern part of the country over their perceived marginalization by the people of the predominantly Christian south (Kabia 2009). Since the country's independence in 1960, the government, civil service, commercial sector and academia had been dominated by the southerners. The resentment of the northern people was further exacerbated by a policy introduced shortly after independence to encourage migration from neighboring countries to boost the flourishing Ivorian agriculture sector. Even though these issues loomed in the horizon, the charisma, competence and strong leadership of Felix Houphouët-Boigny who had been president from 1960 to 2003, ensured effective governance and control of the country. However, following the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 2003 and the collapse of the market prices of cocoa and coffee, the resentments resurfaced and the large number of immigrants began to be seen as a major issue. The anti-immigrant sentiment was exploited by politicians who used it as a tool to gain or hold on to power. This ultimately led to President Bedie passing a law to disqualify non-native Ivorians from participating in governance. The ulterior motive of the policy in itself was to disqualify Alassane Ouattara, the main opposition leader. Nonetheless, the policy infuriated majority of the northern residents many of whom were supporters of Ouattara. The policy also alienated many residents who had been Ivorian citizens for two or more generations and denied them land ownership (FEWER 2002).

The Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire, otherwise known as FANCI, also played a role in the events leading up to the conflict. Since independence, FANCI had been a small force focused on political and developmental activities (Gberie and Addo 2004).

The heavy politicization within the Army limited its capacity as a fighting force while creating tensions within the ranks and file. In the midst of the political tensions which engulfed the country, the Army staged a coup in December 1999 which ousted the unpopular Bedie while the former Army Chief Robert Guei took over (Kabia 2009). Guei again attempted to replicate Bedie's agenda by banning Ouattara from running in the elections of October 2000. However following massive protests, Guei was forced to flee while long time opposition leader, Gbagbo became president. It was Gbagbo's attempt in September 2002 to demobilize 800 members of the Armed Forces that fueled the large-scale attacks leading to the Civil War (Kabia 2009). The renegade soldiers formed the MPCJ rebel group and took control of the northern half of the country. By November 2002, two new rebel groups, the MPCI and MJC, had emerged from the western part of the country. The two groups, mainly made up of former RUF fighters from Liberia and Sierra Leone, claimed to be fighting to avenge the death of General Guei (Kabia 2009). The situation resulted in a proliferation of armed groups accompanied with widespread vandalism and terrorism. When it became evident that a major humanitarian crisis was underway, French troops, who were already based in the country in line with a 1970s defense pact, quickly reinforced and maintained a buffer zone between the warring factions (Gberie and Addo 2004).

Regional Military Intervention in Cote d'Ivoire

ECOWAS condemned the mutiny in line with its policy to denounce any attempt regarding unconstitutional change of government. It offered its support to Gbagbo and kick started actions to sanction a peace deal between the warring factions. Following the failure of ECOWAS to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict, it submitted a proposal for

regional military intervention on 26 October 2002 (Gberie and Addo 2004). The force, called ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), was projected to be made up of 2,386 troops (Kabia 2009). The mandate of ECOMICI was to: monitor the cessation of hostilities; facilitate the return of normal public administrative services and the free movement of goods and services; contribute to the implementation of the peace agreement; and guarantee the safety of the insurgents, observers and humanitarian staff (Malan 2004).

Cote d'Ivoire: Counterinsurgency Practice

The initial strength of 2,386 troops projected for the operation (Benin–300; The Gambia–135; Ghana–265; Guinea Bissau–386; Mali–250; Niger–250; Nigeria–250; Senegal–250; and Togo–300) never really materialized (Gberie and Addo 2004). At the time ECOMICI deployed on 29 March 2003, the force was made up of 1,300 troops from Ghana, Benin, Niger, Senegal, and Togo (Kabia 2009, 146). By the end of May 2004, however, troop strength stood at 3,004 with the involvement of the French Licorne and the UN (Gberie and Addo 2004). On the other hand, however, there are conflicting reports on the actual strength of the rebel factions involved in civil war.

Compared to the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, in Cote d'Ivoire the period of combat was short and the levels of destruction and casualties were relatively low. However, ECOMICI still had some noteworthy setbacks. At the onset, the concept of operations was planned to be in four phases. The first phase involved establishing a safe zone between the north and south while the second phase envisaged extension of the safe zones into other areas of the country for the purpose of creating secure corridors for humanitarian aid. The last two phases targeted disarmament, demobilization and

reintegration (DDR) and withdrawal of troops. The operation however culminated in the first phase. The ECOMICI forces were unable to expand the safe zones beyond the ceasefire line mainly because of lack of sufficient logistics and inadequate strength and combat power. The situation was only saved by the arrival and co-deployment of French forces. This made it possible for ECOMICI to eventually degrade the insurgents and extend its area of operation beyond the initial buffer zone. ECOMICI troops' knowledge of the host country played a significant role in enhancing intelligence gathering and situational awareness (Gberie and Addo 2004). The force was therefore able to infiltrate the warring factions and disrupt their lines of support and sources of funding. In line with the foregoing discussions, the “present” and “absent” variables for COIN practice for the Cote d'Ivoire case study are scored as shown in table 20.

Table 20. Cote d'Ivoire: Counterinsurgency Practice

| Variables for Counterinsurgency Practice | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|--|------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Regional military force had significant advantage in strength and combat power compared to insurgent adversaries. | 1 | The ECOMICI-French Licorne co-deployment provided strength and combat power advantage over the rebel forces. | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Regional military force established and significantly expanded secure areas. | 1 | ECOMICI was eventually able to expand the safe zone beyond the initial buffer zone. | 2 | 2 |
| 3. Use of force and attrition of insurgents yielded positive results. | 1 | Short period of combat was significant enough to degrade the combat power and will of the insurgents. | 2 | 2 |
| 4. Regional military force significantly disrupted insurgent lines of support | 1 | ECOMICI successfully disrupted resupply for rebel fighters | 2 | 2 |

Source: Created by author.

Cote d'Ivoire: Hegemony versus Autonomy

Different from the RMI in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the regional hegemon, Nigeria, did not physically contribute troops to the operation. Although, a Nigerian, Ralph Uweche, was appointed the Special Representative to the Executive Secretary (United Nations 2004a), Nigeria's role in the RMI was minimal compared to the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOMICI gained significant advantage from the consensus and cohesion between the participating countries. The countries involved had a common understanding, especially at the political level. This harmonious relationship was shaped by the fact that the major players in the RMI, notably Senegal, Benin, Niger and Togo, shared a common language and cultural background. This was further reinforced by their knowledge of the operational area, the host country, and Francophone West Africa in general. ECOWAS was able to get the agreement of all the members of ECOMICI before the force deployed (Kabia 2009, 146). In addition, the operational design and rules of engagement were well understood and agreed upon.

Members of ECOMICI had a high level of acquaintance with each other, in most cases, many of the officers from the different countries had attended the same military schools (Gberie and Addo 2004). Joint training and joint exercises had been routinely conducted prior to deployment. This level of familiarity and integration also applied to the French forces who traditionally maintained close ties with many Francophone West African countries. Therefore, unlike the situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone where issues such as: lack of integration in training and doctrine, language barrier, rivalry and lack of consensus at the political and strategic levels, resulted in setbacks on the ground, ECOMICI had the requisite level of consensus to achieve success. Therefore, in view of

the foregoing, the “present” and “absent” variables for hegemony vs autonomy for the Cote d’Ivoire case study are scored as shown in table 21.

Table 21. Cote d’Ivoire: Hegemony versus Autonomy

| Variables for Hegemony versus Autonomy | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|---|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. Regional body had effective control of troop contributing countries. | 1 | ECOWAS had effective control of ECOMICI. | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Other countries unified under a regional hegemon. | 1 | No regional hegemon, unity of interest and cohesion was achieved. | 2 | 2 |
| 3. The hegemon was not perceived as an external aggressor. | 1 | Nigeria played a minimal role in the RMI. | 2 | 2 |
| 4. The hegemon contributed immensely to the success of the RMI effort. | 0 | ECOMICI lacked the support of the regional hegemon. | 2 | 0 |

Source: Created by author.

Cote d’Ivoire: Organizational Structure

The planning for ECOMICI was flawed with inadequacies. The deployment of the force underwent several postponements due to lack of logistics and shortage of manpower for mission planning. As highlighted by Kabia, “the office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense and Security which was responsible for peacekeeping only had two staff. ECOWAS countries, the UNDPKO and the US European Command had to second some of their officers to help with mission planning.” Similarly, Gberie and Ado highlight that “the Executive Secretariat was not organizationally prepared to handle the Ivorian crisis.” The issue of insufficient logistics threatened to derail the operation even at the planning stages. The troop contributing

countries lacked the logistics support needed to deploy their forces, and ECOWAS in turn lacked a standing logistics base which may have served as an alternative. The situation was finally salvaged when support was received from some Western countries.

Specifically, Great Britain provided support to the Ghanaian contingent, France provided mobility and support for Niger, Senegal and Togo, while Benin was supported with medical equipment, light combat vehicles, jeeps and trucks by Belgium (PanaPress News 2003). The US provided strategic transportation support and a majority of the food supplies for the mission (Faye 2004). Some of the troop contributing countries also provided their own logistical support (Gberie and Addo 2004). Although, this conglomerate of logistical support enhanced the logistical capacity of the force and ensured that ECOMICI could deploy into the mission area, it also resulted in some setbacks. The proliferation of different types of equipment resulted in a lack of integration.

The involvement of the UN, similar to the case of Sierra Leone, paved the path for subsequent peace-building efforts. As highlighted by Gberie and Ado, the ECOMICI RMI exemplifies the practice of “hybrid operations” in which the UN takes over and re-hats the RMI for the purpose of engaging in peacebuilding efforts (Gberie and Addo 2004). This set the necessary conditions for ECOMICI to provide security to keep routes open for NGOs to provide humanitarian aid to displaced persons and for movement of refugees. The “present” and “absent” variables for organizational structure for the Cote d’Ivoire case study are scored as shown in table 22.

Table 22. Cote d'Ivoire: Organizational Structure

| Variables for Organizational Structure | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|---|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. The components of the regional force had a unified goal and equal levels of commitment. | 1 | Positive coordination and cooperation between troop contributing countries. | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Effective integration of the various national militaries. | 0 | Lack of integration due to disparate types of equipment. | 2 | 0 |
| 3. The different countries in the RMI had designated areas of operation with freedom of action. | 1 | Freedom of action and unity of effort by different countries. | 2 | 2 |
| 4. NGOs worked in consonance with the regional military bodies. | 1 | UN involvement in the operation facilitated integration of NGOs. | 2 | 2 |

Source: Created by author.

Cote d'Ivoire: Military Strategy

As highlighted by Gberie and Ado, the most important factor for ECOMICI's success was that they had adequate knowledge of the belligerents and their operations (Gberie and Addo 2004). The troops' knowledge of the host country played a significant role in enhancing intelligence gathering and situational awareness. This helped them to maintain communication with the warring factions and prevent situations that may have otherwise resulted in the escalation of the conflict (Kabia 2009, 146). ECOMICI was also viewed as a credible force by the local populace. This nullified any possibilities of resentment and helped the force with intelligence gathering from the locals. As highlighted by Gberie, ECOMICI was not multi-dimensional and hence had to re-organize itself to assist in humanitarian matters (Gberie and Addo 2004). Their efforts were however complemented by NGOs although this created competition between the

two groups. In view of the aforesaid, the “present” and “absent” variables for military strategy for the Cote d’Ivoire case study are scored as shown in table 23.

Table 23. Cote d’Ivoire: Military Strategy

| Variables for Military Strategy | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|---|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. The regional force integrated local militias in their operations with positive outcomes. | 0 | No involvement of local militias was observed. | 2 | 0 |
| 2. Legitimate use of force. | 1 | ECOMICI maintained credibility with local and international community. | 2 | 2 |
| 3. Efficient Intelligence gathering. | 1 | Local populace and the warring factions provided vital intelligence to ECOMICI. | 2 | 2 |
| 4. Incorporation of humanitarian assistance into planning. | 1 | ECOMICI was able to reorganize and integrate humanitarian assistance. | 2 | 2 |

Source: Created by author.

Cote d’Ivoire: Funding

As highlighted earlier, effective intelligence gathering ensured that ECOMICI could disrupt the rebels’ sources of funding. On the other hand, despite the difficulties encountered by ECOMICI, the support provided by the donor countries helped to curb the endemic problem of funding while enhancing the overall capability of the force. As far as peacebuilding efforts were concerned, 40 per cent of the funds was covered by a World Bank loan, and 10 per cent was provided by the EU and other bilateral donors (Gberie and Addo 2004). As highlighted by Kabia however, as of June 2008, only 65 per cent of the \$420 million slated for peacebuilding efforts had been received (Kabia 2009,

147). The “present” and “absent” variables for funding for the Cote d’Ivoire case study are scored as shown in table 24.

Table 24. Cote d’Ivoire: Funding

| Variables for Funding | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
|---|-----------------|---|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. RMI received adequate support and funding from external bodies. | 1 | Western support provided adequate funding. | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Regional force had adequate funding and logistics support to conduct operations. | 0 | ECOMICI had inadequate logistics capabilities and was only saved by French intervention | 2 | 0 |
| 3. Effective identification and targeting of insurgent sources of funding. | 1 | ECOMICI effectively disrupted insurgent sources of funding. | 2 | 2 |

Source: Created by author.

Key Takeaways from the Regional Military Intervention in Cote d’Ivoire

The conduct and outcome of the regional military intervention in Cote d’Ivoire creates significant learning points for RMI in West Africa. First, Anglophone states were less involved in the regional intervention and the sub-regional hegemon, Nigeria, did not have any major involvement in the mission. This helped to ease the inherent setbacks caused by rivalry and lack of cohesion between Anglophone and Francophone states. However, ECOMICI was only saved by the intervention of French troops and support from other Western nations. Without the French forces and support from Western nations, ECOMICI was significantly depleted in strength and logistical capabilities. This emphasizes the importance of the role played by the regional, hegemon, Nigeria and

other nations, such as Ghana, in the sub-region. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria contributed the preponderance of forces and funding for the RMI. This reveals the indispensable role played by Nigeria in the security of the sub-region. Bearing in mind that Nigeria has the largest military force in the sub-region, in order for the concept of “African solutions for African problems” to yield positive results in the future, nations within the sub-region must work towards breaching the obstacles that negate cooperation and consensus. This also emphasizes the need for Nigeria to hinge on its hegemonic position for the purpose of building consensus and eliminating the lack of cohesion in the sub-region. ECOMICI brings to the fore the need for West African states to overcome the traditional lack of cohesion and work towards building effective regional forces while eliminating linguistic and cultural undercurrents.

Another important lesson learned from ECOMICI is that it underlines the importance of establishing an ECOWAS logistical support base. The situation in Cote d’Ivoire was only salvaged by the quick support provided by donors. An ECOWAS logistics base will therefore help to ensure that deployment of forces for RMI efforts is not delayed due to lack of logistical support. A matrix representation of the key features and variables of the Cote d’Ivoire RMI effort as they played out is illustrated in table 25.

Table 25. Cote d'Ivoire Case Study

| COTE D'IVOIRE CASE STUDY | | | | |
|--|-----------------|---|----------------------------|-------|
| Variables | Present /Absent | Details | Weighted Point for Outcome | Total |
| <u>Counterinsurgency Practice</u> 1. Regional military force had significant advantage in strength and combat power compared to insurgent adversaries. 2. Regional military force established and significantly expanded secure areas. 3. Use of force and attrition of insurgents yielded positive results. 4. Regional military force significantly disrupted insurgent LOCs, recruiting and logistics | 1 | The ECOMICI-French Licorne co-deployment provided strength and combat power advantage over the rebel forces | 2 | 2 |
| | 1 | ECOMICI was eventually able to expand the safe zone beyond the initial buffer zone | 2 | 2 |
| | 1 | Short period of combat was significant enough to degrade the combat power and will of insurgents | 2 | 2 |
| | 1 | ECOMICI successfully disrupted resupply for rebel fighters | 2 | 2 |
| <u>Hegemony or Autonomy</u> 1. Regional body had effective control of the operation and the troop contributing countries. 2. Other countries unified under a regional hegemon. 3. The hegemon was not perceived as an external aggressor. 4. The hegemon contributed immensely to the success of the RMI effort. | 1 | ECOWAS had effective control of ECOMICI | 2 | 2 |
| | 1 | No regional hegemon, unity of interest and cohesion was achieved. | 2 | 2 |
| | 1 | Nigeria played a minimal role in the RMI | 2 | 2 |
| | 0 | ECOMICI lacked the support of the regional hegemon | 2 | 0 |
| <u>Organizational Structure</u> 1 The components of the regional force had a unified goal and equal levels of commitment. 2. Effective integration of the various national militaries. 3. The different countries in the RMI had designated areas of operation with freedom of action. 4. NGOs worked in consonance with the regional military bodies. | 1 | Positive coordination and cooperation between troop contributing countries. | 2 | 2 |
| | 0 | Lack of integration due to disparate types of equipment. | 2 | 0 |
| | 1 | Freedom of action and unity of effort by different countries. | 2 | 2 |
| | 1 | UN involvement in the operation facilitated integration of NGOs. | 2 | 2 |

| | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| <u>Military Strategy</u> 1. The regional force integrated local militias in their operations with positive outcomes. 2. Legitimate use of force. 3. Efficient Intelligence gathering. 4. Incorporation of humanitarian assistance | 0 | No involvement of local militias was observed. | 2 | 0 |
| | 1 | ECOMICI maintained credibility with local and international community. | 2 | 2 |
| | 1 | Local populace and the warring factions provided vital intelligence to ECOMICI. | 2 | 2 |
| | 1 | ECOMICI was able to reorganize and integrate humanitarian assistance. | 2 | 2 |
| <u>Funding</u> 1. RMI received adequate support and funding from external bodies. 2. Regional force had adequate funding and logistics support to conduct operations. 3. Effective targeting of insurgent sources of funding | 1 | Western support provided adequate funding | 2 | 2 |
| | 0 | ECOMICI had inadequate logistics capabilities and was only saved by French intervention | 2 | 0 |
| | 1 | ECOMICI effectively disrupted insurgent lines of support | 2 | 2 |

Source: Created by author.

Common Themes from RMI Cases

The final aspect of the analysis in this chapter is the correlation of the data from the three cases to enable a side-by-side comparison of the key features and variables of RMI as they affect the cases. The purpose of this is to identify common themes and trends which can be used to draw inferences or make deductions. This juxtaposition of data from the various cases brings out some findings that can provide answers to different questions about approaches that contribute to the success of RMI.

One of the most significant findings from the side-by-side analysis of the three cases is that the key features of RMI investigated, and the variables therein, have a direct influence on the outcome of regional military intervention. Without delving much into

how the individual variables affected the outcome of the RMI, the pattern of the “present” and “absent” factors, represented by 1 and 0 respectively, alone is sufficient to give an indication of the outcome of the RMI. As shown in table 26, the interplay between present and absent factors predicts the outcome of the RMI. Specifically, the Liberia case has a total of 3 present factors out of a possible 19 factors. In contrast, the Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire cases have a total of 14 and 15 present factors respectively out of a possible 19 factors. Hence, the cases (Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire) where RMI was successful have a high number of present factors. This indicates that the implementation of the key features of RMI, and the practices therein, create a high likelihood of a successful regional military intervention. On the other hand, the Liberia case where RMI failed had a relatively low number of present factors. This indicates the detrimental effect of neglecting key RMI and COIN practices.

Another important finding from the analysis is that success in RMI is more achievable when all the key features and practices are mutually adopted as much as possible. In other words, the success of any RMI effort is dependent on mutually reinforcing lines of effort and lines of operation. This is mainly because the frequency at which “present” factors occur in cases where RMI was successful makes it necessary to suggest that no single practice, out of all the outlined variables, is insignificant. They all need to be adopted in consonance with each other for best results to be achieved. For example, as indicated in the Liberia case, even when the regional military force had an effective hegemon present, the inability of the various contingents to work out a unified goal with equal levels of commitment, significantly hampered any chances of success. In the Cote d’Ivoire scenario however, the reverse was the case. In Cote d’Ivoire, the

regional force appeared to have a unified goal with equal levels of commitment but the absence of the regional hegemon posed a significant risk to the success of the RMI effort. This trend occurred in several other aspects across the three cases.

Key Findings from Individual Features of RMI

Based on the aggregation of data from the three cases, it is clear as shown in table 26 that use of force and degrading of insurgent capabilities yields positive results. This trend appeared to be consistent across all the cases. The analysis shows unambiguously that degrading of insurgents capabilities has consistently yielded positive results in RMI in West Africa. This finding is reflected in the “Total” column of the table. From the table, an aggregate score of 5 was obtained for: “Use of force and attrition of insurgents yielded positive results.” The importance of this practice is even more pertinent when one considers that use of force still yielded positive results in the Liberia case amidst the failure of the RMI.

The analysis also shows that, some other practices which are closely related to use of force and degrading of insurgent capabilities, consistently achieved positive results. For example, factors such as: having significant advantage in strength and combat power compared to insurgents, ability to expand safe zones, and ability to sever insurgent lines of support all consistently yielded positive results in the Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire cases. Hence, from the table, each of these practices obtained an aggregate score of 4 in the “Total” column. While it may seem that these practices are intuitive for any military operation conducted against an adversary, the presence or absence of the factors, as the case may be, have greatly predicted success or failure of the RMI cases considered. In the two cases where RMI prevailed, the regional military force had significant advantage in

strength and combat power, they successfully disrupted insurgent lines of support, and they expanded safe zones. On the other hand, in the Liberia case, none of these factors were achieved.

Another factor brought to light by the analysis is the criticality of having a unified goal and equal levels of commitment from all stakeholders involved in the RMI. From the table, this factor obtained an aggregate score of 4, due to its influence on the Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire cases. As discussed earlier, ECOMOG RMI efforts in Liberia were flawed by lack of consensus at the political level between the participating countries. Inevitably, the disunity at the political level resulted in poor working relationships between forces on the ground. This aspect is also directly tied to the importance of cohesion of forces. It is evident from the case studies that the lack of a joint doctrine, joint training, and language barrier have significantly hampered the integrability of the military forces of Anglophone and Francophone countries in West Africa.

A significant finding from the analysis is the importance of the role played by NGOs in RMI. NGOs traditionally incorporate peacebuilding strategies and programmes to support military lines of effort in counterinsurgency operations. In contrast with the Liberia case, the involvement of the UN in the Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire RMI ensured that peacebuilding efforts such as dis-armament, re-integration of former combatants, restoration of essential services and capacity building, complemented the efforts of the regional military force. This factor contributed immensely to the success of the RMI and resulted in relatively lasting peace and stability in the countries. Hence, from the table, the factor: "NGOs worked in consonance with the regional military

bodies” obtained an aggregate score of 4 indicating its impact on the success of RMI in West Africa.

The criticality of intelligence gathering as a prerequisite for success in regional military operations was also brought to the fore in the analysis. As shown in the table, “efficient intelligence gathering” obtained an aggregate score of 4. This aspect was well captured during the discussions about the cases. Effective intelligence gathering enabled the regional force in Sierra Leone and Liberia to disrupt insurgent operations. Another factor which obtained a score of 4 in the table is “legitimate use of force.” In the Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire cases, majority of the population in the area supported the regional force because they viewed their actions as legitimate. In the Liberia scenario, the opposite was the case, the regional force was unable to obtain popular support from the populace thereby impacting on their ability to gather intelligence. This finding underscores the importance of the population-centric aspect of regional military intervention in West Africa.

Table 26. Aggregation of Data from all Cases

| ALL CASES (ASSESSMENT) | | | | |
|--|---------------|--------------|---------------|----------|
| VARIABLES (KEY FEATURES OF RMI) | SCORES | | | |
| | Liberia | Sierra Leone | Cote d'Ivoire | Total |
| <u>Counterinsurgency Practice</u> | | | | |
| 1. Regional military force had significant advantage in strength and combat power compared to insurgent adversaries. | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 2. Regional military force established and significantly expanded secure areas. | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 3. Use of force and attrition of insurgents yielded positive results. | 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| 4. Regional military force significantly disrupted insurgent lines of support | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| <u>Hegemony or Autonomy</u> | | | | |
| 1. Regional body had effective control of the operation and the troop contributing countries. | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Other countries unified under a regional hegemon. | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 3. The hegemon was not perceived as an external aggressor. | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 4. The hegemon contributed immensely to the success of the RMI effort. | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| <u>Organizational Structure</u> | | | | |
| 1 The components of the regional force had a unified goal and equal levels of commitment. | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 2. Effective integration of the various national militaries. | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| 3. The different countries in the RMI had designated areas of operation with freedom of action. | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 4. NGOs worked in consonance with the regional military bodies. | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| <u>Military Strategy</u> | | | | |
| 1. The regional force integrated local militias in their operations with positive outcomes. | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| 2. Legitimate use of force. | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 3. Efficient Intelligence gathering. | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 4. Incorporation of humanitarian assistance | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| <u>Funding</u> | | | | |
| 1. RMI received adequate support and funding from external bodies. | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 2. Regional force had adequate funding and logistics support to conduct operations. | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| 3. Effective identification and targeting of insurgent sources of funding. | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Sum of Present Factors/Total Numer of Factors | 3/19 | 14/19 | 15/19 | |

Source: Created by author.

Summary of Chapter 4 and a Preview of Chapter 5

This research reports on the demonstrated effectiveness of some key practices of RMI through case studies of past regional military operations in West Africa. The overarching purpose is to identify key approaches, practices and factors that can enhance the ongoing efforts of the MNJTF in its attempt to establish civil security in the Lake Chad Basin region. Using the Charles Ragin QCA model and guidelines from the RAND study of counterinsurgency operations in different parts of the world, this chapter carries out qualitative analysis of past RMI cases in West Africa, namely: the ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1997 respectively, and the ECOMICI intervention in Cote d'Ivoire in 2003. The analysis in this chapter focuses on identifying factors and themes that have featured prominently in past RMI efforts in West Africa which contributed to or hindered successful regional military intervention. The lessons learned and findings from the analysis provides a sufficient evidence base from which recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the MNJTF can be made.

For each of the cases examined, the chapter provided a narrative on the brief background of the conflict. This was followed by highlights of the RMI efforts in each case, and the factors that featured prominently and influenced either success or failure. Therafter, for each case, the key findings and matrix illustrations of the key factors were provided. Finally, using information, trends and common themes found across all the cases, the key findings of the analysis were highlighted.

Chapter 5 of this research provides a list of recommendations that the MNJTF can adopt in order to make its ongoing efforts to establish stability in the Lake Chad Basin region more effective. The recommendations generated are based on the outcome of the

analysis in chapter 4. Using the evidentiary support from the analysis, the variety of factors that have consistently affected RMI and yielded positive results are advocated. One of the key findings from the analysis is that, historically, RMI has prevailed when “success” factors are implemented, and the “failure” factors are avoided.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Whenever different countries bring together their security forces for the purpose of addressing a common threat within a region, it becomes imperative to identify practices and approaches that can give the regional military force the best chance of prevailing. Many scholars in the literature have advocated a variety of approaches through which the effectiveness of multinational operations can be enhanced for addressing conflicts. However, two major contentious issues arise from the study of the voluminous data on multinational operations available in the literature. First, bearing in mind that different regions across the globe have different operational environments with peculiar geo-political, socio-economic and military issues, it becomes increasingly difficult to employ a blanket approach for enhancing the effectiveness of every RMI. Second, rather than through the use of conventional recommendations from the literature, a significant base of evidential support is required in order to propose approaches to enhance the effectiveness of RMI in any specific region.

Against this backdrop, this research set forth to identify factors and themes that have been prevalent in past regional military COIN operations in West Africa which, to a large extent, have shaped the conduct and outcome of RMI efforts in the sub-region. By studying historical cases of RMI in the sub-region, the focus is to determine factors that facilitated or, in some cases, hindered the success of past regional military interventions. Deductions drawn from this will achieve two main goals. First, it will pave the path for factoring out themes that have been prevalent in past RMI efforts in West Africa. Second, it will create the evidential base for drawing lessons learned which can inform and

enhance the operations of the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin region. In doing this, this research provides the basis for a better understanding of the dynamics and issues surrounding regional military intervention in West Africa while highlighting areas where improvements are needed.

The Findings of Chapter 4

Based on the analysis of the individual cases and the relationships in the data across the three cases examined, some interesting findings were made. One of the most significant and straightforward observations is that, for each case, the balance between the present factors and the absent factors sufficiently predicts the outcome of the RMI. In the cases where a relatively high number of present factors as opposed to absent factors were recorded, for example Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, the RMI was successful. Conversely, in the Liberia case where more absent factors than present factors were recorded, the RMI was unsuccessful. What this means is that, the higher the number of positive practices implemented by the RMI, the greater its chances of success. Therefore without carrying out any detailed analysis of the individual cases, the simple implementation of positive RMI practices as much as possible increases the chances of success. This finding is even more interesting when one considers that the conventional determination of the outcome of the RMI made before the analysis was based on information from the literature rather than observation of present and absent factors.

Another important finding from the analysis in chapter 4 suggests that no single variable is insignificant. From table 26, one can observe that the variables responsible for the success of the Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire cases respectively, are not completely identical throughout the table. Hence, it is vital for all the key RMI features and practices

to be mutually adopted as much as possible. In other words, the success of any RMI effort is dependent on mutually reinforcing lines of effort. This is mainly because the frequency at which “present” factors occur in cases where RMI was successful makes it necessary to suggest that no single practice, out of all the outlined variables, is insignificant. They all need to be adopted in consonance with each other for best results to be achieved.

The analysis also identified individual factors that consistently yielded positive results across the cases. This was determined based on the score obtained after the data from all the cases was aggregated. The analysis suggests that “use of force” and “ability of the RMI to degrade insurgent capabilities” has an overwhelming effect on the proceedings of the RMI. The analysis highlights this aspect unambiguously because the observation of its positive impact was made across all the cases examined irrespective of the eventual outcome of the RMI. Along this line, the criticality of expanding safe zones and having superior strength and combat power in relation to insurgents was also brought to the fore. Furthermore, arguments about the criticality of intelligence gathering, legitimate use of force, the need to sever insurgent lines of support, and the need to win over the local population were also well advocated by the analysis.

The importance of cohesion, having a unified goal, and developing equal levels of commitment by the various components of the RMI cannot be overemphasized. This aspect was stressed during the discussions about the individual cases and from the analysis of the data across all cases. From the analysis and scores recorded, it is impossible to downplay the criticality of joint COIN training and doctrine, cultural

awareness, language training, and the need to bridge relationship gaps between stakeholders that make up RMI efforts in the sub-region.

It is also evident from the analysis that the role of NGOs in regional military interventions in West Africa is crucial. The role played by NGOs in RMI in West Africa is even more intuitive when one considers the socio-economic, infrastructural and geo-political shortfalls that characterize many parts of the sub-region. The analysis makes it clear that regional military interventions have greater likelihoods of success when peacebuilding lines of effort are employed in consonance with military lines of effort. Another important factor worth mentioning is the role that militias have played in RMI in West Africa. From the analysis it is clear that, in two of the cases where the RMI worked with local militias, some positive results were recorded. However, for the Liberia case, attempts to engage with militias led to disastrous outcomes. This highlights the need to exercise caution when the use of local militias is considered by the regional military force bearing in mind that the analysis suggests mixed outcomes. This issue is pertinent especially because of the involvement of local militias, such as the so called “civilian joint task force,” in ongoing COIN efforts against Boko Haram.

Recommendations

Using information obtained from the study of the literature, analysis of data, and interpretation of results, it is necessary to provide recommendations for the MNJTF to enhance its capacity to restore stability in the Lake Chad Basin region. These recommendations are also applicable to any regional military COIN effort in sub-Saharan Africa and indeed other regions of the world. The recommendations are timely and sufficient to contribute to the ongoing RMI effort against Boko Haram.

Generally, when engaging in regional military COIN operations, it is crucial to, as much as possible, assess the presence or absence of the prescribed factors and make appropriate changes to the operational approach. Not every positive practice or approach prescribed in this thesis can actually be successfully achieved by the MNJTF or indeed any regional military force. There is however no limits on the number of practices which the MNJTF should engage in to increase its chances of success. As evident from the analysis, RMI efforts have a higher likelihood to prevail when the number of positive practices outweigh detracting practices. Hence, the MNJTF must endeavor to engage in as many of the prescribed practices as possible, for the any requisite length of time. This means the MNJTF must avoid any proposal or plan that emphasizes a unilateral approach at the expense of other positive practices. While accepting the validity of concerted practices, they must be incorporated into the institutional bedrock of the RMI effort and all its components. The proposed practices must also be indoctrinated into training and planning at all levels.

For the leadership of the multinational effort and the heads of the individual contingents, this means that necessary steps must be taken to ensure that the RMI effort is adequately resourced such that sufficient number of troops and combat power are generated. The MNJTF's operational approach must also prioritize degrading of insurgent capabilities through use of force especially at the early stages of the intervention. Along these lines, as evident from the analysis, is the importance of establishing and expanding safe zones. Based on the cases studies, this factor has consistently shaped proceedings and influenced the eventual outcome of RMI operations. The need to expand safe zones is even more pertinent when one considers that one of

Boko Haram's main strengths rests on its ability to use ungoverned spaces, porous international borders and safe havens for retreat, training and regrouping. This also ties into the insurgent group's need to maintain its agenda of creating a Caliphate hence its desire to control territory, as well as expand.

Efforts must also be made to ascertain that the support needs of Boko Haram, such as recruitment pool, sources of logistics, training and financial support are effectively identified and severed. Even though Boko Haram's brutality has hindered its ability to draw support primarily from the local population, the insurgent group is still able to forcefully obtain some level of local support by instilling fear in the local populace. In addition, the group has relied heavily on support from external actors and it has demonstrated its ability to recruit fighters across international borders. Boko Haram is also able to maintain resource flows, both material and financial, through: sponsors, use of high-level criminal activity, (such as robbery, extortion, kidnapping, and looting) and from other terrorist groups. The MNJTF must therefore consider population-centric COIN approaches while targeting the support coming from external actors. The MNJTF should specifically channel planning and operations towards disrupting the transfer of supplies, personnel and other types of support from external actors in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa and the world. Then approaches specifically targeting their supply chain, along with efforts to eliminate the influence of Boko Haram in the region and win over the population, must be employed concurrently. In addition this strategic and operational approach must be encapsulated into doctrine and training to facilitate a holistic implementation.

The leadership of the MNJTF must also take necessary steps to ensure that the non-military components of the intervention, such as NGOs, are incorporated into planning at the strategic and operational levels. Non-military components also need to be well postured to complement the military effort, and the activities of all parties must be well coordinated to ensure mutual support. Along this line, planners must take necessary steps to integrate humanitarian aid into the RMI effort.

On the wider scope, ECOWAS should encourage further development of joint training at all levels between the various militaries in the sub-region. Training should focus on aspects such as mission planning, joint operations center working, and integration of logistics and humanitarian efforts amongst others. The organization should also make concerted efforts to develop a joint doctrine focused on COIN operations for security forces in the sub-region. As highlighted during the discussions on the Cote d'Ivoire case, the importance of an ECOWAS logistics base furnished with standby sustainment capabilities cannot be overemphasized. Along the same line, efforts must be targeted at increasing cultural awareness and reducing the language barrier between the various contingents in the sub-region. West African states also need to overcome the traditional lack of cohesion and work towards building effective relationships amongst themselves.

Summary of Recommendations

In order to enhance the effectiveness of the ongoing regional military COIN effort against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region, the following must be considered:

1. The MNJTF should strive to adopt as many of the prescribed positive practices of regional military operations, for as long as possible. Efforts must be made to

ensure that the key features and practices prescribed are mutually adopted as much as possible. The proposed concepts must also be incorporated into the institutional bedrock of the MNJTF, and indoctrinated into training and planning at all levels.

2. The MNJTF should take necessary steps to ensure that the ongoing RMI effort is adequately resourced such that sufficient number of troops and combat power are generated. The MNJTF's operational approach must also prioritize degrading of insurgent capabilities through use of force especially at the early stages of the intervention. Furthermore, continuous efforts must be made to expand existing safe zones in the current operational environment.
3. The MNJTF must implement population-centric COIN approaches to win over the population while directly targeting insurgent lines of support coming from external actors.
4. The MNJTF must ensure that peacebuilding lines of efforts are employed in consonance with military lines of effort. The leadership of the MNJTF must also take necessary steps to ensure that the non-military components of the intervention, such as NGOs and IGOs, are incorporated into planning at the strategic and operational levels.
5. The MNJTF should exercise caution when the use of local militias such as the so called civilian joint task force is considered.
6. ECOWAS should encourage further development of joint training at all levels of operation between the various militaries in the sub-region.

7. ECOWAS should make concerted efforts to develop a joint doctrine focused on COIN operations in the sub-region.
8. ECOWAS should strive to establish a logistic support base furnished with standby sustainment capabilities for regional military operations.
9. ECOWAS member states should develop approaches to overcome the traditional lack of cohesion and work towards breaking barriers and building effective relationship between the various security forces in the sub-region.

Conclusion

Since 2009, the militant Jihadist group Boko Haram established itself as a regional threat in the areas surrounding the Lake Chad Basin of Africa. The group has carried out attacks in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, killing and abducting people and destroying villages and military bases. The group's violent activities, with the attendant casualties and regional spill-over, has posed an unprecedented threat to human security and the stability of Nigeria and the region as a whole. The AU authorized the mobilization of the MNJTF to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency and restore stability to the region. This work therefore focused on identifying what is needed to enhance the effectiveness of the MNJTF in order to build its capacity to combat Boko Haram.

Hence, using case studies of past RMI efforts in West Africa, the monograph examines factors that have facilitated as well as hindered successful regional military interventions in the sub-region. Specifically, the research explored the ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1997 respectively; and ECOMICI in Cote d'Ivoire in 2003. The findings from the case studies provide new insights that can inform ongoing regional COIN operations in West Africa. Specifically, the study brings

to the fore the need for the MNJTF to implement a variety of prescribed mutually supporting practices in order to increase its chances of success. The study also highlights individual factors that consistently yielded positive results across the cases. The analysis suggests that factors such as: use of force, ability of the RMI to degrade insurgent capabilities and sever lines of support, criticality of expanding safe zones and having superior strength and combat power in relation to insurgents amongst others, have a significant effect on the proceedings of the RMI. The importance of cohesion, having a unified goal, and developing equal levels of commitment by the various components of the RMI were also emphasized. These identified factors provided the evidential support from which recommendations were made to the MNJTF.

Relevance to Field of Study

The research carried out in this monograph involves a broad investigation of approaches which can give regional military interventions in West Africa the best chances of succeeding in COIN operations. The work is premised on the need to enhance the effectiveness of the MNJTF in its attempt to restore stability to the Lake Chad Basin region. The research is timely as it seeks to find approaches to address the ongoing challenges posed by the Boko Haram insurgency in the sub-region. A variety of key features which characterize RMI were examined through a comprehensive study of existing literature on regional military operations in West Africa. The findings provide the evidence base from which recommendations can be made to enhance the effectiveness of regional COIN operations in the sub-region and indeed in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

The lessons learned from the study of the literature and data analysis can be used to inform COIN strategies or policies across the DOTMLPF domain. The general contents of this monograph will be of interest to military planners who are responsible for operational design of regional military interventions and joint, multi-national operations in sub-Saharan Africa. The individual member states that make up troop contributing countries in the sub-region will find some useful information that can be used in the planning and preparation of their forces for regional military interventions.

In the US, the work will be of interest to policy makers in government and USAFRICOM planners who specialize in sub-Saharan Africa conflicts and COIN mechanisms. The issues and ideas raised in this work can also inform U.S security assistance efforts aimed at helping security forces in West Africa to effectively and professionally respond to insurgency while strengthening their ability to contribute to international peacekeeping missions. Some examples of these security assistance efforts include: the State Department's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA), and the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program, called Flintlock, sponsored by USAFRICOM every year. Furthermore, the information in this monograph can be relevant to the ongoing US support provided to the MNJTF. Finally, the work will provide some new insights for academics and scholars who are interested in historical research on conflicts and regional military operations in West Africa.

Recommendations for Further Study and Analysis

This research focused on the study of conflicts and regional military interventions in West Africa. The primary objective was to identify what can be learned from past RMI efforts in West Africa which could inform the ongoing COIN operations of the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin region. Using data collected on certain key features of RMI, variables and outcomes of past regional military COIN operations, the research identified common themes and key takeaways from past RMI efforts. These findings therefore provided the evidential base for making recommendations aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the MNJTF and indeed other ongoing regional COIN operations in sub-Saharan Africa or other regions of the world.

This work concentrated on the difficulties and prospects of regional military efforts in COIN operations. As identified during the study, peacebuilding efforts must be implemented in consonance with military lines of effort in order for lasting peace and stability to be realized. Clearly, peacebuilding will be a major focus of ECOWAS, the MNJTF, and the governments of the countries surrounding the Lake Chad Basin region especially after the Boko Haram threat has been effectively neutralized. The importance of post-conflict peacebuilding cannot be overemphasized when discussing the topics of COIN and stability in sub-Saharan Africa and indeed other regions of the world.

Against this backdrop, a study assessing the challenges and prospects of sub-regional post-conflict peacebuilding efforts will not only be interesting and relevant, such a study will also be timely thereby providing some new insights to inform peacebuilding efforts in the Lake Chad Basin region. This kind of study will consider factors that have hindered or facilitated effective post-conflict peacebuilding and humanitarian initiatives

such as disarmament, resettlement of refugees, reintegration of former insurgents, restoration of essential services and capacity building initiatives. This proposed study is even more crucial when one considers that, to a large extent in areas affected by conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, the transitional period between COIN operations and long-term stability has been fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. In some instances, conflicts have resurfaced a few years after relative peace was achieved. In this vein, a possible research question should focus on identifying the factors that determine success or failure in post-conflict peacebuilding. The research should also strive to identify the role of regional and international actors in the peacebuilding process. A suitable approach to this end is to compare post-conflict peacebuilding efforts with a view to identifying prospective and flawed peacebuilding strategies.

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